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I. INTRODUCTION 
The commercial general liability insurance industry shifted, in 
1986, from the use of an "occurrence-based" to a "claims-made" 
policy form.! So-called "tail" or "long tail,,2 claims have continued 
nevertheless, to be asserted under the older "occurrence" policies 
which required that injury occur during the term of the policy, but 
not that the claim for such injury be made or brought at any par-
ticular time.
3 
In seeking state approval to use the new "claims-
made" form in 1985-86, the insurance industry represented that 
the new form would not affect coverage under the old 
"occurrence" form.
4 
Despite that representation, insurers are now 
1. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 773-76 (1993) 
(discussing the Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO) 's introduction on the market 
of "claims-made" policies and their regulatory approval in 1986). 
2. See Carolyn M. Frame, "Claims-Made" Liability Insurance: Closing the Gaps 
with Retroactive Coverage, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 165,166 n.7 (1987) (discussing the princi-
pal advantage of a claims-made policy for insurers as the avoidance of "tail liabil-
ity") . 
3. See Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Economics of the Insurance Antitrust 
Suits: Toward an Exclusionary Theory, 63 TuL. L. REv. 971, 975 (1989) (explaining 
that under an old occurrence policy covering the year 1956, insureds were pro-
tected against claims made by workers who were exposed to asbestos during that 
year even if the claims were not filed until 1986). 
4. See Letter from Michael A. Hatch, Esq., on file with the William Mitchell 
Law Review. During this 1985-86 period Mr. Hatch was the Minnesota Commis-
sioner of Commerce and, as such, was the primary regulator of the business of in-
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asserting, in the guise of an "allocation" claim, that "occurrence 
coverage" is progressively reduced as each year goes by between the 
date of the "occurrence" and when the claim is made.5 This asser-
tion involves a contrived, intricate, and novel interpretation of an 
ambiguous insurance policy provision, and thus cuts across well-
accepted canons of insurance policy interpretation. Such an inter-
pretation would impair coverage that has already attached, and 
would also impair reasonable expectations on the part of the in-
sured. 
II. THE RESULT OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY'S DECISION TO 
SWITCH FROM AN "OCCURRENCE" TO A "CLAIMS-MADE" POLICY 
Insurers covering commercial general liability risks suffered 
increasingly serious losses in the 1970s and 1980s.
6 
These losses re-
sulted primarily from United States insureds' claims of injury from 
causes such as environmental pollution and inhalation of asbestos 
surance in the State of Minnesota. Mr. Hatch's letter includes the following in-
formation: 
Id. 
Representatives of the Insurance Services Office (ISO) told me that in-
sureds would not suffer as a result of a change to claims-made coverage. 
ISO explanatory materials stated: 
· " Business with growing businesses to protect would be able to up-to-
date [sic] limits for current claims and not have to look for coverage in 
old policies with potentially inadequate limits. Under the occurrence 
form, the insured must select policy limits that will ultimately be used to 
protect the assets from claims or judgments made two, five or sometimes 
ten or more years after the expiration of the occurrence policy. 
· " ISO representatives also stated that the obligation of insurers under 
the prior occurrence policies would stay the same notwithstanding the 
future shift to claims-made coverage. ISO also presented materials repre-
senting that the claims-made policies would be excess over any applica-
ble prior insurance. 
· " Neither ISO nor insurers ever advised me, or to my knowledge any 
other State of Minnesota officials or the Minnesota public generally, that 
the switch to claims-made policies would result in gaps or reductions of 
prior occurrence "all sums" policies. Moreover, they never suggested that 
occurrence trigger concepts could be applied to claims-made policies or 
years in a way to reduce the long tail liability protection of existing poli-
cies. 
5. See Frame, supra note 2, at 184 (discussing the severe gaps in coverage 
that can occur during the transition from "occurrence based" to "claims-made" 
policies). 
6. See generally George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort 
Law, 96 YALE LJ. 1521, 1534-35 (1987) (asserting that the insurance losses were 
due to changes in the liability system which caused insurance for commercial risks 
to unravel). 
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fibers.' These losses not only affected the operations of United 
States-based insurers, both direct underwriters and reinsurers, but 
also the world market in insurance and reinsurance, predomi-
nantlywritten through Lloyd's of London.8 
To limit substantial insurer exposure to future claims, general 
liability insurers dictated, beginning in late 1985, a major change 
in the form and content of the policy used to cover business com-
mercial risks.9 The previously available "occurrence based" policy 
was replaced by a "claims-made" policy.10 "Occurrence based" cov-
erage, adopted as a new standard form in 1966,1l had been inter-
preted over the ensuing twenty-year period, in accordance with ex-
press policy terms, to apply to injury occurring during the specific 
term of the insurance policy, but regardless of when the claim was 
first made. 12 Coverage under the policy was triggered by the occur-
rence of injury during the applicable policy period. 13 The event 
causing the injury did not need to occur during the policy year; it 
could have occurred years earlier. 14 What was required was that in-
jury of a kind covered under the policy, caused by a covered event, 
7. See David Ornelas, Insurance Law: An Analysis of Lloyd's of London (Apr. 
7, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the William Mitchell Law Review) 
(noting Hurricane Hugo and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 as additional 
causes of financial losses for Lloyd's of London) (citing Allen v. Lloyd's of Lon-
don, 94 F.3d 923, 927 (4th Cir. 1996». _ 
8. See id. More recently, as losses for various syndicates at Lloyd's mounted, 
several syndicates (partnerships) began calling on their guarantors (partners), 
known popularly as "names." See id. at 5,9-11. Since the liability of each syndicate 
is unlimited, the result was a major loss or, in some cases, bankruptcy for some of 
the "names." See id. at 9-11. Major litigation brought by such names against 
members of Lloyds in both England and the United States has attracted substan-
tial media attention. See id. at 11. 
9. See Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 3, at 974. The major changes were 
aimed at eliminating tail liability and reducing losses by including legal defense 
costs as part of the stated policy limits. See id. 
10. See id.; see also infra Part II.E. (discussing the efforts to reduce the vol-
ume of losses attributable to any particular policy by replacing "occurrence based" 
policies by "claims-made" policies). 
11. See infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text for the standard 1966 policy 
definition of "occurrence." 
12. See infra note 76 and accompanying text. 
13. See Frame, supra note 2, at 168-69. Under the exposure theory devel-
oped by the courts, liability was imposed on any insurer who provided coverage at 
any time the claimant was exposed to the harm. See id. at 170. 
14. See id. Under the triple trigger theory, liability was allocated "to all in-
surers providing coverage effective at any time during the period extending from 
initial exposure to the manifestation of injury or disease," and the insurers were 
thus liable for the entire loss. Id. at 171. 
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result during the policy year.
IS 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a 
number of courts held that once a particular policy was "triggered," 
coverage under that policy extended to any continuation of that 
injury that developed in years following the specific policy year.
16 
Because of these interpretations of the general liability policy, in-
surer losses for a particular policy year were extended by losses 
which developed in subsequent years, but which resulted from the 
same "occurrence.,,17 As a consequence, insurers "on the risk" for a 
particular policy year found that claims could be asserted many 
years after the specific policy year. IS Losses attributable to that year 
continued to be asserted years after the specific policy terminated, 
and the curve of such lines of losses, in a number of situations, in-
19 
creased over the subsequent years. Insurers were thus unable, at 
any particular time, to draw a line across the losses attributable to a 
particular policy year and "close the books" for that year.
20 
They 
were therefore unable to establish the ultimate total cost to the un-
derwriters or syndicates for that year.21 This liability, following 
years after the close of a particular policy year, became known as 
"tail" or "long tail" liability.22 
A key reason for substituting the "claims-made" standard pol-
icy in 1986 for the previously available "occurrence" based policy 
was to eliminate this "tail.,,23 While the "claims-made" policy con-
tinued to define the risks covered in terms of "occurrence,,,24 a new 
15. See infra note 103 and accompanying text for a discussion of "triggered" 
occurrence based coverage. 
16. See Frame, supra note 2, at 170. 
17. See id. at 171. 
18. Seeid.at170-71. 
19. See Ayers & Siegelman, supra note 3, at 972 (citing Sorry, Your Policy is 
Canceled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 18 (noting that as a result of increased claims, 
litigation and premium increases came to be known as the insurance crisis». 
20. To eliminate their responsibility for these past risks, insurance compa-
nies included, in some "claims-made" policies, provisions which ended liability for 
injuries that occurred before a certain cut-off date, typically the date upon which 
the first claims-made policy was issued to the insured. See Ayers & Siegelman, su-
pra note 3, at 972. 
21. See Brander v. Nabors, 443 F. Supp. 764, 767 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (stating 
that occurrence policy provides unlimited prospective coverage), affd, 579 F.2d 
888 (5th Cir. 1978). 
22. See Ayers & Siegelman, supra note 3, at 974 n.16 (discussing 
"occurrence" tail liability in environmental pollution and asbestos cases). 
23. See id. at 974-75 (discussing tail liability) ; see also infra Part II.F for an ex-
planation of the way in which a "claims-made" policy functions. 
24. See Jeanne H. Unger, Introducing the 1996 ISO/CGL Policy, Plus, The Roles 
of Defense and Coverage Counse~ 1996 MINN. INST. LEGAL EDUC. 3, reprinted in Insur-
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condition was introduced to limit coverage under a specific Rolicy 
to claims-made during the course of that specific policy year. Un-
der this form of policy, claims coming to light after a specific policy 
period expired would not be covered.
26 
This policy was intended 
to permit insurers to draw a line across losses attributable to a par-
ticular policy year, and thus restrict liability allocable to that year to 
a relatively short period following the end of the policy year or 
term.
27 
This change inevitably resulted in a substantial reduction of 
coverage for the insured. 
A state may require that the form of each insurance policy, in-
cluding terms and conditions, be approved by the state's commis-
sioner of insurance before use.
28 
In introducing the new "claims-
made" general liability form,29 the insurance industry told state 
authorities that the effect of the new "claims-made" policy would be 
prospective only.30 The new form, it was said, would not affect in-
'd d d h d'" " £, 31 B surance proVl e un er t e prece mg occurrence orm. ut, 
that explanation notwithstanding, liability insurers are now assert-
ing . a novel· argument that "tail" liability under the old 
"occurrence" policies should be progressively reduced each year 
that passes between the end of the "occurrence" policies (1985) 
and the year in which the claim is made for coverage under the old 
"occurrence" policy.32 The result of this argument would be the 
production of a phenomenon unique in the world of insurance-
progressively disappearing coverage. Under this argument an in-
surer which might have been liable for a loss of $1 million (full pol-
icy limits) had the claim been asserted in 1985, can become liable 
for only one eighth of that loss ($125,000) if the filing of the un-
ance Senrices Office, Inc. (ISO) 1996 CGL Policy. 
25. See Frame, supra note 2, at 165. 
26. See id. 
27. See Unger, supra note 24, at 8 (stating that duties in the event of occur-
rence include notice of occurrence as soon as practicable, and information re-
garding the occurrence). 
28. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 72C.l0 (1996) (stating that Minnesota requires 
that such approval be given for particular policies and insurers prior to the use of 
the form for insuring risks). 
29. See infra Part II.F for a description of "claims-made" provisions found in 
earlier forms of insurance policies. 
30. See Letter from Michael A. Hatch, Esq., supra note 4. 
31. Id. See also H. James Wulfsberg & Timothy A. Colvig, The 1986 Commercial 
General Liability Insurance Program, 291 PLI Real Est. & Practice Course Handbook 
Series No. 593, 603 (Apr. 1, 1987). 
32. See id. at 606-08. 
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derlying claim is delayed until 1992.33 
The thesis of this article is that the coverage of the insured, de-
termined by reason of the application and interpretation of the old 
"occurrence" policies and risks that became fixed under those 
policies during the "occurrence" policy term, should not be ad-
versely and progressively reduced as a result of a decision of the in-
surance industry to switch from the "occurrence" to the "claims-
made" policy format in 1986. The novel insurer argument is a con-
trived, intricate, and unique interpretation oflanguage deliberately 
used in the "occurrence" policy-language that is patently ambigu-
ous. No reasonable business person purchasing "occurrence" cov-
erage from 1966 through 1985 could have foreseen such an argu-
ment. The notion of triggered occurrence insurance progressively 
disappearing as a result of a later change in a subsequent policy 
form would have been regarded as lacking any reasonable support 
in the language of the policy.34 Under long-standing and univer-
sally applied canons of insurance policy interpretation such a novel 
argument should not prevail. Nor should it prevail in the light of 
an additional and more recent doctrine, now clearly a part of Min-
nesota law35_ the doctrine that directs a court to give effect to the 
reasonable expectations of the insured.
36 
33. The insurer argument can be illustrated as follows. Suppose that the 
specific "occurrence" based policy year was 1985 and that the policy limit of li-
ability was $1 million. Suppose further, that the risk triggered under the 1985 
policy was a spill of hazardous materials. Had a claim been asserted shortly after 
the spill for liability exceeding the $1 million policy limit, the insurer's obligation 
would have been to pay the $1 million. Now suppose that it became impossible 
for the insured to purchase coverage for this risk in years 1986 and thereafter. 
"Claims-made" coverage, even had it been written to cover environmental pollu-
tion risks, would have been triggered only if the claim was made in the specific 
year of the policy. Such "claims-made" coverage was the only form of general li-
ability coverage available in 1986 and thereafter for businesses with diverse opera-
tions of substantial size. Thus, for the years 1986 through 1991, as a result of the 
function of the "claims-made" condition, the insured had no available insurance 
coverage under those policies for the 1992 claim. Despite a factual finding that 
the risk that attached under the 1985 policy caused initial injury in 1985, the trig-
gered 1985 occurrence insurer argues that its liability should be limited to one 
eighth, because the injury from the 1985 spill continued up to the date of the 
claim. 
34. See Hancock Lab., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520, 523 n.5 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (stating that one of the three general policy interpretation principles is 
that the court should strive to give effect to the objectively reasonable expecta-
tions of the insured). 
35. See infra note 299 and accompanying text discussing the "reasonable ex-
pectations" doctrine under Minnesota law. 
36. See Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 523 
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A. How Conventional Liability Insurance Works 
Most people are familiar with liability insurance and how it 
operates in connection with the coverage they have for the opera-
tion of owned or borrowed automobiles.
37 
Under the conventional 
automobile liability policy the insurer promises two distinct forms 
of coverage: (1) the provision of a legal defense in the event of a 
claim against the insured arising out of the insured's operation of 
an automobile; and (2) the payment of any reasonable settlement 
or judgment arising as the result of such a claim up to the limits of 
the policy.38 No one would question that this coverage attaches at 
the time of an accident and extends to cover and include injury 
which becomes apparent only at a later time and after the term of 
the particular automobile policy has ended. In other words, cover-
age becomes fixed at the time of the accident and extends to in-
clude subsequently developing injury causally related to the acci-
dent.
39 
In the same way the conventional understanding of general 
business liability coverage would be that if a tire exploded causing 
injury to the driver of the vehicle at the time of the explosion, the 
manufacturer would be covered under the policy in effect at that 
time for all damages resulting from the tire explosion although the 
claimant might have ongoing and developing injuries for years to 
come. Needless to say, subject to statute of limitations require-
ments, the result in these cases would not be affected in any way by 
N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994); Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 
366 N.W.2d 271 (Minn. 1985); text discussion beginning at note 303 infra. 
37. See ROBERT E. KEETON & AlAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAw: A GUIDE TO 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES app. H, at 
1122-23 (student ed. 1988) (containing the liability coverage portion of a personal 
automobile insurance policy) [hereinafter KEETON & WIDISS]. 
Id. 
38. See id. A personal automobile insurance policy states: 
We will pay damages for "bodily injury" or "property damage" for which 
any "insured" becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident. 
Damages include prejudgment interest awarded against the "insured." 
We will settle or defend, as we consider appropriate, any claim or suit 
asking for these damages. In addition to our limit of liability we will pay 
all defense costs we incur. Our duty to settle or defend ends when our 
limit of liability for this coverage has been exhausted. 
39. See Benike v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 520 N.W.2d 465, 466 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1994) (finding that injuries caused by a power line downed during an accident 
were causally related to the accident); Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Jerome, 
833 P.2d 429,431 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting insurance policy as stating that 
the insurer must pay all sums which insured must pay "because of bodily injury or 
property damage to which this insurance applies" caused by an accident resulting 
from the ownership, maintenance or use of an insured vehicle). 
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the date the plaintiff chose to file the claim. 
Comprehensive general liability insurance, the kind of insur-
ance coverage on which businesses rely for a variety of business op-
eration risks, operates in essentially the same way. The standard 
liability policy not only imposes a "duty to defend" upon the in-
surer, requiring it to defend claims against the insured, but also 
provides that the insurer can select counsel, control the defense ef-
forts, and settle claims within its sole discretion.
40 
In reality, an in-
surer often "gets away" with breaching its duty to defend. If the in-
surer does not defend, the prudent commercial policyholder will 
retain counsel and defend the action rather than risk a large de-
fault judgment, attempting to mitigate damages. The policyholder 
then pursues reimbursement from the insurer.
41 
Absent a finding 
of bad faith refusal to defend, the court may only require the in-
surer to repay the policyholder's counsel fees plus interest and the 
counsel fees incurred in obtaining coverage.
42 
Although these 
amounts are not trivial, they often impose no penalty on the in-
surer that breaches the duty to defend.
43 
Absent punitive liability, 
the insurer often attains substantial freedom to refuse to provide a 
defense.44 
Some insurance policies, generally using standard language, 
provide the insurer with an option (but not an obligation) to de-
fend and an obligation only to reimburse reasonable defense 
costs.
45 
Depending on policy lanauage and circumstances, defense 
costs are reimbursed as incurred. These policies create a "duty to 
40. See KEETON & WID ISS, supra note 37, § 9.1 (b), at 988. Some standard 
policies alternatively require the insurer to reimburse the policyholder's defense 
costs without requiring the insurer to retain the attorneys. 
41. See id. § 9.1 (a). 
42. See id. (stating that an insurer's refusal to defend is a breach of the in-
surance agreement). 
43. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. National Computer Sys., Inc., 490 
N.W.2d 626 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that "[i]f any part of the cause of ac-
tion against the insured is arguably within the scope of the [insurance] policy's 
coverage, the insurer must defend," but ordering the insurance company to pay 
only the reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending claims and not the costs 
of a counterclaim). 
44. When an insurer declines to provide a defense for an insured, some 
courts treat it as a breach of the insurance agreement and award only contract 
damages. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 37, § 9.1 (a), at 988. 
45. But see Unger, supra note 24, at 1 (stating that the standard language of 
CGL states "[w]e will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any 
"suit" seeking those damages"). 
46. See id. at 9. 
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reimburse" rather than a duty to defend.47 The standard liability 
policy provides for the defense, or reimbursement of defense cost, 
in addition to payment of the policy limits for indemnity as neces-
sary.48 A common variant, found particularly in excess policies, ex-
plicitly provides a set limit of coverage that includes both defense 
and indemnity in determining when policy limits have been ex-
49 
hausted. 
B. How the Comprehensive General Liability Policy ("GCL") Worked 
From 1966 through 1985, the dominant liability insurance pol-
icy form used for the writing of business risks was the Comprehen-
sive General Liability Policy (CGL), known as the "occurrence" 
based policy. 50 This form of policy was used to cover a variety of 
risks arising out of business operations including general liability 
risks, of which the escape of environmental pollutants became a 
notable example,5l and products liability, covering risks arising out 
of the sale of allegedly defective products, including defective de-
sign, manufacture, operation, or failure to warn.52 Considerable 
47. See id. 
48. See id. at 6. 
49. See Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 3, at 974 (listing the allegation made 
by the Attorneys General's anti-trust action, including that the insurers' "Revised 
CGL forms ... end the historical obligation of the insurer to pay the full legal 
costs of defending a claim and substitute a defense cost cap, under which the in-
sured's legal defense costs are counted as part of the stated policy limits .... "). 
50. See id. at 977 (describing the 1983 ISO Board of Directors decision to 
support both occurrence and claims-made forms and the subsequent turmoil that 
led to the ISO withdrawal of support of the occurrence form onJuly 1,1987). 
51. See Eugene R. Anderson et ai., Liability Insurance: A Primer For Corporate 
Counsel, 49 Bus. LAw. 259 (1993). "[T]he insurance industry introduced, for a 
brief period of time in the mid-1970s, the Environmental Impairment Liability 
(ElL) insurance policy .... [T]he policy was sold on a 'claims-made' basis." Id. at 
264. The ElL policy was not a CGL policy. See Steven G. Eggimann, Commercial 
Insurance Issues: Toxic Torts, 1986 MINN INST. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1986) (enumerating 
various exclusions not generally found in CGL policies but found in ElL policies 
such as worker's compensation, willful acts, nuclear explosions, fines and penal-
ties, and most importantly the exclusion of the duty or right to defend). 
52. The CGL policy began with a "Declarations" page listing the different 
coverages packaged together under this form and the separate premiums alloc-
able to each of the coverages activated under the particular policy. This page also 
specified the overall liability cap for each policy year, if there was one, and with 
respect to products liability coverage, limits "per occurrence," if any; deductibles, 
if any; and the aggregate products liability cap for each policy year, if there was 
one. See Anderson, supra note 51, at 26tHJ9. For a comparison between current 
"occurrence policy," new "occurrence policy," and new "claims-made" policy, see 
Douglas L. Skor, CGL Coverage Making the Transition: History of CGL Policy, 1986 
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litigation has arisen over the application and interpretation of this 
CGL policy, including coverage of claims for injury resulting from 
environmental pollution and asbestos inhalation.53 Much of this 
litigation has related to claims for gradual or progressive injury, 
occurring over a period of years, and therefore potentially covered 
by a number of different insurance policies. 54 Claims for gradual 
or progressive injury have raised questions of proof for the insured 
as to when the particular injury occurred (i.e., which policy year 
was implicated), how long the injury continued (i.e., which series 
of policies was potentially implicated), whether there was one oc-
currence or multiple occurrences, and how investigation and de-
fense, as well as loss, costs should be allocated among the different 
MINN. INS. & LEGAL EDUC. app., at 1. 
53. See, e.g., Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 
517 N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn. 1994) (discussing the "sudden and accidental" pollu-
tion exclusion interpretation). 
54. See infra Part II (explaining the "trigger" of each "occurrence" based 
policy is the happening of injury during the policy term. Where injury, which may 
have been caused by an event which preceded the beginning of the particular pol-
icy term, continued across a series of years, each policy in effect during that se-
quence of years may be "triggered" depending upon the facts of the particular 
case). 
In any particular insurance policy year, different insurers may be implicated as 
the result of the writing of excess insurance. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 37, 
§ 7.8(e). It was not uncommon for an insured to purchase a policy from a pri-
mary insurer and then purchase additional coverage from an excess insurer or 
series of excess insurers. See id. Such excess insurers have been, in some cases, 
stacked in layers, with each successive layer constituting a joint venture between 
the insurers on the risk in that layer in accordance with an agreed upon percent-
age of the risk within that layer for each such participant, which is interpreted in 
varying ways depending upon the facts of the case. See id. Under such an ar-
rangement, no excess insurer generally becomes liable until the amount of the 
underlying limits has been exhausted, and thereafter the process of exhaustion 
moves up layer by layer. See id. 
Thus, in any particular policy year, it is possible that the happening of an in-
sured event could "trigger" coverage under a sometimes bewildering number of 
insurance carriers. This process of using multiple layers, with participation by a 
number of insurance carriers in each layer, is, of course, a vehicle of choice for 
spreading a significant risk across a wide number of carriers. 
The Supreme Court, in HartfMd Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 
(1993) described "reinsurance," as an additional way of spreading insurance 
among a wide group of carriers. Primary insurers themselves purchase insurance 
to cover a portion of the risk they assume from the insured. This "reinsurance" 
serves at least two purposes, protecting the primary insurer from catastrophic loss, 
and allowing the primary insurer to sell more insurance than its own financial ca-
pacity might otherwise permit .... Insurers who sell reinsurance themselves often 
purchase insurance to cover part of the risk they assume from the primary in-
surer; such 'retrocessional reinsurance' does for reinsurers what reinsurance does 
for primary insurers. Id. at 772-73 (citations omitted). 
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. 55 lnsurers. 
C. The Evolution of the eGL Policy 
Liability policies have existed in some form since the late nine-
teenth century.56 However, general liability policies were not in-
troduced in significant degree until the 1940s.57 The standardized 
"comprehensive" general liability policy, or CGL, "first appeared in 
1940-41 and was revised in 1943, 1955, 1966 and 1973.,,58 The first 
such standard liability insurance policy used an "accident" as its 
"trigger" or basis for initiating coverage.59 Typical pre-1966 CGL 
language provided that the insurer would pay on behalf of the in-
sured all sums which the insured became legally obligated to pay 
as damages because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including 
death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person 
caused byaccident.5O 
By the 1960s both insurers and insureds became concerned 
that in court the "accident" trigger might be interpreted as not 
covering gradual (no "big bang" accident) injury.61 As one court 
put it, describing the type of form used by General Accident Insur-
ance from 1960 to 1964: 
(a) From October 1960 to October 10, 1964, General Ac-
cident's policy provided property-damage-liability cover-
age for "all sums which the insured shall become legally 
obligated to pay ... for damages because of injury to or 
destruction of property ... caused by accident." The term 
55. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 773. 
56. See S. S. HUEBNER ET AL., PROPERlY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 353 (3d ed. 
1982). 
57. See Frame, supra note 2, at 169. 
58. John P. Arness & Randall D. Eliason, Insurance Coverage for "Property 
Damage" in Asbestos and Other Toxic Tort Cases, 72 VA. L. REv. 943, 945 (1986); 
Eugene R. Anderson et aI., Liability Insurance: A Primer For Corporate Counse~ 49 
Bus. LAw. 259, 262-63 (1993) ("[AJn executive of The Travelers Insurance Com-
pany described the new 1941 Comprehensive General Liability policy as follows: 
'Take each policy needed ... , weld them together in a Comprehensive coverage, 
limiting exclusions to a minimum and adding automatic coverage for any new 
venture an insured may care to undertake, and you have one of the most potent 
weapons for protection ever afforded a risk."'). 
59. See I EUGENE R. ANDERSON ET AL., 'INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION § 1.2, 
at app. A (1997) (describing evolution of the CGL language and reproducing the 
1955,1966,1973, and 1985 policy language). 
60. See id. at 447. 
61. See Morton Int'l v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 835-
36 (NJ. 1993). 
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"accident" was undefined. The policy afforded coverage 
"only to occurrences or accidents which happen during 
th 1· . d ,,62 e po ICY peno .... 
527 
Because the word "accident" was undefined, disputes arose 
concerning whether an accident had to be a sudden and episodic 
event or whether it could be an injury-causing process or system 
that took place over an extended period of time.63 While courts 
construing the accident language policies found coverage for losses 
that resulted from gradual happenings as well as rapidly occurring 
events,64 the Insurance Services Office (ISO), representing some 
1,400 domestic property and casualty insurers, revised the standard 
comprehensive liability form. 65 The result was the drafting, aJr 
proval, and release of the CGL occurrence based policy in October, 
1966.66 Practical considerations dictate that commercial liability in-
surers use the standard ISO approved form. 67 
Contemporaneous statements of drafters and insurer repre-
sentatives made at or shortly before the occurrence based form was 
approved and issued, indicated an intention that the new form 
cover gradual and progressive injury.68 These drafters and repre-
62. Id. 
63. See id. at 836. 
64. See, e.g., Moffat v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 238 F. Supp. 165, 172-74 
(M.D. Pa. 1964); Elco Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 414 N.E.2d 41, 46 (Ill. 
App.1980). 
65. See Moffat, 238 F. Supp. at 171. 
66. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 59, §1.2. 
67. See generally Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 772 
(1993). The ISO: 
Id. 
is the almost exclusive source of support services in this country for CGL 
insurance .... ISO develops standard policy forms and files or lodges 
them with each State's insurance regulators; most CGL insurance written 
in the United States is written on these forms .... For each of its stan-
dard policy forms, ISO also supplies actuarial and rating information: it 
collects, aggregates, interprets and distributes data on the premiums 
charged, claims filed and paid, and defense costs expended with respect 
to each form ... and on the basis of this data it predicts future loss 
trends and calculates advisory premium rates .... Most ISO members 
cannot afford to continue to use a form if ISO withdraws these suppon 
services. 
68. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 59, § 4.2. 
[F]or insurance companies, the new ton liabilities presented tremen-
dous opponunity for growth. As long as there were "satisfactory limita-
tions in the area of the particular hazard," most insurance companies 
were willing to introduce language that would explicitly provide cover-
age for the hazard. Even in the area of gradual property damage, insur-
ance companies seemed more willing, sanguine, and eager to provide 
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sentatives also recognized that multiple policies in multiple years 
might be implicated, discussed the potential sharing of risk among 
different insurers, and reported a decision not to include a work-
ing apportionment of loss formula applicable between the differ-
ent eGL insurers.69 
D. Language of the "Occurrence" Based Policy 
Effective October 1, 1966, the standard policy form defined 
"occurrence" as follows: 
'Occurrence' means an accident, including injurious ex-
posure to conditions, which results, during the policy pe-
the coverage. 
See id. (citation omitted); see also Trial Transcript at 15547, Coordination Proceed-
ing, Asbestos Insurance Coverage Cases, volume 133 (Cal App. Dep't Super. Ct. 
1986). 
Id. 
After extensive discussion it was agreed that with respect to product bod-
ily injury liability insurance it is not the undeIWriting intent to require 
any element of suddenness as a condition of coverage afforded on a 
caused-by-accident basis. It is the intent to afford coverage for unin-
tended and unexpected bodily injury resulting from exposure over a pe-
riod of time no matter how long that period of time might be. This 
raises questions in connection with the application of policy limits as well 
as the policy period condition. 
69. See, e.g., R.A. Schmalz, New Comprehensive General Liability and Automobile 
Program, MUT. INS. TECH. CONF., Nov. 15-18, 1965, at 6. 
The policy applies under the new program to bodily injury or property 
damage which occurs during the policy period. Inasmuch as the new 
policies afford blanket occurrence coverage it is possible that where the 
injury actually occurs over two or more policy periods, the Claims De-
partment will have to make some sort of reasonable allocation to each. 
There is no pro-ration formula in the policy, as it seemed impossible to 
develope [sic] a formula which would handle every possible situation 
with complete equity. 
Id.; see also Norman Nachman, The New Policy Provisions for General Liability Insur-
ance, 10 THE ANNALS 197, 199-200: 
Id. 
The definition embraces an i~urious exposure to conditions which re-
sults in injury. Thus, it is no longer necessary that the event causing the 
injury be sudden in character. In most cases, the injury will be simulta-
neous with the exposure. However, in some other cases, injuries will take 
place over a long period of time before they become manifest. The slow 
ingestion of foreign matters and inhalation of noxious fumes are exam-
ples of injuries of this kind. The definition serves to identify the time of 
loss for application of coverage in these cases, the injury must take place 
during the policy period. This means that in exposure-type cases, cases 
involving cumulative injuries, more than one policy contract may come 
into play in determining coverage and its extent under each policy. 
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riod, in bodily injury or property damage neither ex-
pected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.70 
529 
This language was intended to clarify that gradual continuing in-
jury was covered. However, the language was still ambiguous and 
the new definition was more restrictive than the interpretation of 
"accident." As a result, in 1973, the Comprehensive General Liabil-
ity policy was changed.7l 
As amended in 1973, the standard form definition provided 
that "occurrence" meant an accident, including continuous or re-
peated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury or 
property damage neither expected nor intended from the stand-
. fh' d 72 pomt 0 t e msure . 
The 1973 revisions thus stated even more clearly that gradual 
and progressive injury was covered.7~ The natural parsing of the 
words used indicates that the intended trigger is bodily injury or 
property damage resulting during the policy period.74 There is no 
requirement that the "accident, including continuous or repeated 
exposure to conditions" occur during the policy period.'5 Clearly, 
there is nothing in the coverage language that affects the scope of 
coverage afforded by reason of the date the claim for injuries is 
70. Morton Int'l v. General Ins. Co. of Am., 629A.2d 831, 836 (NJ. 1993). 
71. See JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE § 4492, at 15 
(1979). 
72. See ANDERSON ET AL. supra note 59, app. A, at 462. 
73. Since 1973, an "occurrence" has continued to be commonly defined to 
mean an "accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially 
the same general harmful conditions." See, e.g., The Insurance Professional's Policy 
Kit: A Collection of Sample Insurance Forms, ALLIANCE OF AM. INS., 1995-96, at 388. 
The current version of the standard CGL policy provides that it applies "only if' 
an insured becomes "legally obligated to pay" because of bodily injury or property 
damage that "occurs during the policy period." See id. 
The 1973 Form also provides that injuries expected or intended by the insured 
are not to be deemed accidental. This is the "intentional act exclusion" which, 
depending on the CGL form in question, was sometimes defined in the 
"Definitions" section of the policy or the insuring agreement, rather than in the 
exclusions section. See generally JEFFREYW. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE 
CONTRACTS § 24 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (reviewing and outlining intentional con-
duct defenses of insurers). The intentional act exclusion is not intended to pre-
clude coverage for the insured's negligence. Even gross negligence and stupidity 
by the insured is not itself sufficient to make the intentional act exclusion appli-
cable. See, e.g., Arco Indus. Corp. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 531 N.W.2d 168, 
177 (Mich. 1995); Armstrong World Indus. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 690 (Ct. App. 1996); see also STEMPEL, § 24.3. 
74. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 59, at 275. 
75. See id. at 275-76. 
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first made against the insured. 76 Despite various efforts to define 
and refine the coverage afforded under the CGL policy, the lan-
guage appears to be a walking ambiguity.77 The colorful title of 
one recent article dealing with coverage disputes in product liabil-
ity cases with delayed manifestation injuries and damages makes 
the point rather nicely: "NailingJell-O to a Wall .... ,,78 Another set 
of authors said: 
The word "occurrence" is one of the least understood and 
most misunderstood words in today's insurance language. 
One author has described it as "elusive" and another as 
"haunting." Sometimes it means "cause," sometimes it 
means "effect," and sometimes, within the very same pol-
icy, it means "cause" in one place and "effect" in an-
other .... It is impossible to overemphasize the fact that 
the occurrence concept is an integral part of the pro-
posed claims-made coverage.... It is inexplicable that 
ISO did not resolve the "long tail," "latent injury," or 
"long term exposure" issue. 79 
A federal circuit court of appeals noted recently that even the 
insurance industry itself could not agree on anyone consistent in-
terpretation of this language in the CGL policy: 
The insurance industry has been and remains unable to 
agree on a consistent interpretation of the form wording 
in NGC's policies as applied to asbestos claims and other 
progressive injury claims. For example, on this appeal, 
CU takes the position that 'bodily injury' within the mean-
ing of its policies occurs only at the point in time when 
the asbestos-related diseases were either manifested or be-
came fully developed, while AMICO, joined by a second 
group of insurers, contends that only those policies in ef-
fect during the period of a claimant's exposure to asbestos 
must respond to the asbestos-induced bodily injury 
76. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 59, at 264. "In contrast [to a claims-
made policy], an 'occurrence' policy provides coverage for injury or damage 
which happens during the policy period, regardless of when the claim for injury 
or damages is first made against the policyholder." Id. 
77. "In its simplest terms, the occurrence is the causative event or happen-
ing that ultimately results in injury or damage." Id. at 272. 
78. See Tung Yin, NailingJell-O to a Wall: A Uniform Approach For Adjudicating 
Insurance Coverage Disputes in Product Liability Cases with Delayed Manifestation Inju-
ries and Damages, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1243 (1995). 
79. Eugene R. Anderson et aI., Proposed New Claims-made Liability Insurance 
Policy: Panacea Or Golden Road To Disaster?, 298 PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice 
Course Handbook Series No. 393, 415-17 (1986). 
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E. The Plan to Reduce the Volume of Losses 
531 
In 1977 the ISO began to revise the CGL form once again. 81 
For the first time, in 1984, the ISO proposed two CGL forms, one 
with the familiar "occurrence" type language, the other containing 
a new "claims-made" type language.82 A dispute then arose within 
the ISO membership, with one faction pressing to eliminate the 
"occurrence" form, along with sudden and accidental pollution 
coverage, and advocating a cap on defense costs.83 Notwithstanding 
this dispute, the ISO Board of Directors approved the two 1984 
CGL forms, rejecting the changes sought by this faction.84 Not con-
tent with this result, the faction threatened a general refusal by in-
surers to reinsure risks if the 1984 forms were used, and invoked 
the assistance of London-based underwriters to make good on that 
threat.85 The language of the complaints in Hartford, as summa-
rized in the Supreme Court opinion, suggest the rest of the story: 
"[A]s a consequence, many London-based underwriters, syndicates, 
brokers, and reinsurance companies informed ISO of their inten-
tion to withhold reinsurance on the 1984 forms, ... and at least 
some of them told ISO they would withhold reinsurance until ISO 
incorporated all four desired changes .... ,,86 This threat suc-
ceeded and the ISO 1984 forms were withdrawn from the market 
and replaced with forms, including the new "claims-made" form, 
containing the new provisions.87 The final act in this drama, as 
summarized by the Court from the complaints, reads as follows: 
"Mter ISO got regulatory approval of the 1986 forms in most States 
where approval was needed, it eliminated its support services for 
the 1973 CGL form, thus rendering it impossible for most ISO 
members to continue to use the form.,,88 
From and after the beginning of 1986, most insureds needing 
broad and significant liability coverage were unable to purchase 
80. Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1192-93 
(2d Cir. 1995). 
81. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, S09 U.S. 764, 773 (1993). 
82. See id. 
83. See id. 
84. See id. at 774. 
8S. See Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 3, at 977. 
86. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., S09 U.S. at 77S. 
87. See id. 
88. See id. at 776. 
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"occurrence" based insurance in amounts of any consequence.89 
The only available policy for such insureds was the CGL "claims-
d " . 90 rna everSIon. 
F. How the CGL "Claims-Made" Policy Works 
Several fundamental changes were made in the new "claims-
made" form. First, to be valid under the policy, a claim now 
needed to be made during the policy term. This insurance applies 
to "bodily injury" and "property damage" only if a claim for dam-
ages is first made against any insured during the policy period.91 In 
this fashion, the "trigger" of the new policy is the making of a claim 
in the policy year, rather than injury resulting during the policy 
year from an "occurrence" as provided under the earlier policy.92 
Second, a "retroactive date" was often inserted to control the 
extent to which the new policy would cover claims for injury or 
property damage that occurred prior to the policy term. " [T] his 
insurance does not apply to 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' 
which occurred before the retroactive date, if any, shown in the 
Declarations or which occurs after the policy period.,,93 The inten-
tion of the drafters was, apparently, that the insurer would fix as 
the "retroactive date" the date of first issuance of a "claims-made" 
policy to the insured, thus separating and differentiating the new 
"claims-made" coverage from any earlier "occurrence" coverage, 
particularly including any "tail," on at least a primary basis.94 
Third, the coverage language of the "occurrence" policy, pro-
viding that the insurer would pay "all sums which the insured shall 
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury or 
damage to which this policy applies," was changed to "[w]e will pay 
those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as 
d 
,,95 amages .... 
Fourth, pollution or contamination coverage was almost com-
89. See Ayers & Siegelman, supra note 3, at 978. 
90. See id. at 990. An "occurrence" policy form has now been reintroduced 
but is still commercially unavailable for many companies with numerous poten-
tially significant risks. See id. at 992-93. 
91. SeeWulfsberg & Colvig, supra note 31, at 601. 
92. See id. at 600-01. 
93. [d. at 647. 
94. See, e.g.,. Florida Hosp. Trust Fund v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, 103 T.C. 140, 143 (T.C. 1994); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Landauer Assoc., 
Inc., No. 88CIV.434, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13422, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9,1989). 
95. Wulfsberg & Colvig, supra note 31, at 647. 
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pletely excluded.96 Two authors described the new policy shortly 
after its issuance as follows: "[t]he new claims-made form is the in-
surance industry's response to these latent injury and long-term 
exposure cases. Under the claims-made policy, there will be only 
one policy, and one set of limits, applying to any particular latent 
i~ury claim.,,97 These 1986 changes were the first major revision of 
the CGL form to restrict rather than expand coverage. 98 
The operative effect of these changes needs to be understood. 
Assume that property damage begins in 1980 and continues 
through 1984. Under the "occurrence" policy, the insured gener-
ally has coverage for each of the five years with a separate cap on 
liability for each of the five years. Thus if the liability cap was $1 
million for each policy term, the insured may have access to $5 mil-
lion of coverage. Under the "claims-made" policy, assuming the 
same facts, but adding an assumption that a claim is made only in 
the last year, 1984, even though the insured purchased and paid 
for insurance in each of the five years and both injury and damage 
occurred in each of these five years, recovery is generally limited to 
the policy in effect in 1984 (the year in which the claim is made). 
Thus, coverage is generally limited to $1 million.99 
State insurance commissioner approval of the new "claims-
made" form was provided for under many state laws. lOo ISO repre-
sentatives, in seeking state approval, represented that the "claims-
made" policy would not affect obligations under any outstanding 
" " bdl" 101 occurrence ase po lCles. 
In what may be viewed as an amusing alteration, the drafters of 
the "claims-made" form apparently decided to change the content 
of the word called out by the initial "c" in "CGL." Previously, the 
"c" stood for "comprehensive." With the "claims-made" policy the 
96. See id. at 595-96. 
97. Id. at 598. 
98. See Frame, supra note 2, at 174. 
99. The most significant difference between the occurrence basis coverage 
and the claims-made coverage is the limitation imposed by the latter on the tails 
of liability by requiring that notice of any claim be provided during the term of 
the policy. See In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464, 468-70 (N.D. Cal. 
1989); Sparks v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 495 A.2d 406, 410 (NJ. 1985); Hoechst Celanese 
Corp. v. Lloyd's of London, 656 A.2d 1094, 1095 (Del. 1995) (reviewing the dif-
ferences between occurrence and claims-made policies); see also JEFFREY W. 
STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 32.3.3 (1994 & Supp. 1996). 
100. See In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 469. 
101. See Letter from Michael A. Hatch, Esq., supra note 4. 
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"c" apparently was now changed to "commercial."lo2 
G. How the "Occurrence" Tail Has Worked Out as Illustrated in the 
Environmental Pollution and Asbestos Cases 
Under the "occurrence" based policy, injury or damage must 
take place before the policy is triggered. lo3 Mere accidents or neg-
ligence do not trigger that policy. 104 Only those occurrences that 
cause injury or damage are covered, and then only the insurer or 
insurers on the risk when the i~ury takes place "within the policy 
period" are responsible. lo5 If the causative negligence predates in-
jury by a large enough period of time, the insurer on the risk when 
the insured erred may not be responsible for coverage, while the 
insurer on the risk when the error produces injury is responsible 
for coverage. 106 The Minnesota case, Singsaas v. Diederich,107 clearly 
illustrates the focus on injury rather than negligence as the trigger 
of CGL coverage. 108 In Singsaas, the insured improperly con-
structed industrial equipment in one year but the defect did not 
injure a worker until a later year. 109 The insurer on the risk when 
the equipment was constructed was not responsible and coverage 
was provided by the insurer on the risk at the time the injury oc-
curred. IIO This basic proposition is sometimes obscured because 
policyholders normally retain the same liability carrier for several 
consecutive years, making an inter-insurer dispute over that cover-
102. See Wulfsberg & Colvig, supra note 31, at 595 (stating that the new pol-
icy also has a new name-"Commercial General Liability," instead of 
"Comprehensive") . 
103. See Irene A. Sullivan & William T. Wright, Jr., Hazardous Waste Litiga-
tion: CGL Insurance Coverage Issues, 369 PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course 
Handbook Series No. 387 (1989). 
104. See, e.g., Young v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 870 F.2d 610, 610-11 (11th 
Cir. 1989) (stating that mere negligent installation was insufficient to trigger cov-
erage since no physical injury occurred); Greenlee v. Sherman, 536 N.Y.S.2d 877 
(1989) (noting that in a property insurance case, there must be actual physical 
damage to the property before the policy is triggered). 
105. See William R. Hillman & Mary R. DeYoung, Allocation of Environmental 
Cleanup Liability between Successive Insurers, 17 N. Ky. L. REv. 291, 293 (1990). 
106. See, e.g., American Home Prods. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 748 F.2d 
760, 763 (2d Cir. 1984); Dow Chern. Co. v. Associated Indem. Corp., 724 F. Supp. 
474,481 (E.D. Mich. 1989), affd, 935 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1991); Sentinel Ins. Co. 
Ltd. v. First Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 894, 915 (Haw. 1994); Singsaas v. Diederich, 238 
N.W.2d 878, 880-81 (Minn. 1976). 
107. 238 N.W.2d 878 (Minn. 1976). 
108. See id. at 880-82. 
109. See id. at 879-80. 
110. See id. at 880. 
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age relatively unlikely. 
The most prominent examples of insurers disputing the time 
of injury-and the fact and definition of injury itself-involve 
physical injuries or diseases that develop over an extended period 
of time as a result of exposure to an allegedly toxic materia1. 111 
The asbestos coverage litigation has been instrumental in de-
veloping a body of coverage law focusing on what "triggers" a CGL 
policy when the claimant alleges injury over a period of time, injury 
which is not immediately apparent to the victim. ll2 Pollution claims 
have also contributed to the explosion of "trigger" law in the 1980s 
and 1990s.m 
One type of environmental pollution claim involves the spill or 
discharge of toxic material on owned property,114 which then 
gradually migrates through the soil until it reaches underground 
water such as an aquifer, or percolates through to adjoining neigh-
boring property.ll5 Injury to the aquifer (state property), or injury 
to an adjoining land owner's property, has generally been held to 
be covered under the CGL "occurrence" policy.ll6 The insured's 
first problem was to establish the time of the actual happening of 
any such injury, if a specific date for the spill(s) was unknown, so 
that a specific policy year could be implicated. ll7 The Minnesota 
Supreme Court has resolved this dilemma for the insured by adopt-
ing a rebuttable presumption118 that the injury occurred in equal 
Ill. See Michael G. Doherty, Allocating Progressive Injury Liability Among Suc-
cessive Insurance Policies, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 257, 257 (1997) (noting that asbestos-
related cases may take "decades" to evolve). 
112. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 
1212, 1215-16 (6th CiT. 1980) (discussing occurrences which "trigger" a policy 
when a progressive injury is involved). 
113. See Yin, supra note 78, at 1243 (noting that some products liability cases 
pose significant problems concerning the time a policy is triggered). 
114. The "occurrence" policy typically excluded liability for injury to owned 
property. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW: 
AN ANALYSIS OF TOXIC TORT AND HAzARDous WASTE INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES 172-
73 (1991). 
115. See id. at 164-69 (explaining that damage to neighboring lands may be 
actual, imminent, or non-imminent). 
116. See id. at 163-73 (detailing the application of CGL policies to third-party 
clean-up costs, as well as to costs incurred to clean pollution sources on the in-
sured's own property). 
117. See id. at 172-73 (explaining the importance of the timing of injury to 
the resolution of coverage issues). 
118. See Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 523 N.W.2d 657, 
664 (Minn. 1994) (stating that the insurer is given the burden of rebutting the 
presumption). Where the insured can establish precisely when the injury oc-
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increments for each of the years between the occurrence of the 
first spill and the assertion of the date of discovery or cleanup.1I9 
Thus, the insurer on the risk at the time of the first spill is impli-
cated first, and each successive policy thereafter, between the date 
of spill and date of discovery or cleanup, is also implicated, raising 
a question of allocation of the loss among the several insurers. 
Courts have concluded, appropriately, that insurers should not be 
able to escape liability on the basis of a burden of proof argument, 
since they clearly intended to provide coverage for gradual and 
• •• 120 
progressIve InJury. 
curred, as in SCSC v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co., this presumption is displaced, 
and the policy implicated in the year of the "escape" is responsible for all dam-
ages which follow. See 536 N.W.2d 305, 314 (Minn. 1995). The Minnesota Su-
preme Court further clarified this point in its recent decision in Domtar, Inc. v. 
Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 733 (Minn. 1997): 
It is inaccurate to conclude that a CGL insurer is never liable for dam-
ages occurring outside of the policy period. CGL policies come in many 
forms and it is a mistake to read our case law as if the scope of coverage 
has been resolved for all such policies, no matter what their language. 
The proper scope of coverage also will depend on the facts of the case. 
When environmental contamination arises from discrete and identifiable 
events, then the actual-injury trigger theory allows those policies on the 
risk at the point of initial contamination to pay for all property damage 
that follows. See SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 318 
(Minn. 1995) (despite continuing damage from leaching of chemicals 
into the groundwater after the policy period, only the primary and ex-
cess policies on the risk at the time of the discharge were triggered, but 
those policies responded to the entire loss). This interpretation of the 
policies is in accord with the common understanding of the terms 
"occurrence" or "accident." 
119. See Northern States Power Co., 523 N.W.2d at 664 (stating that when dam-
ages have occurred over multiple policy periods, "the trial court should presume 
that the damages were continuous from the point of the first damage to the point 
of discovery or cleanup. A party wishing to show that no appreciable damage oc-
curred during a triggered policy period bears the burden of proving that fact"). 
See, however, the significant interpretation of NSP provided in the Minnesota Su-
preme Court's opinion in Domtar, 563 N.W.2d at 733-34: 
It is only in those difficult cases in which property damage is both con-
tinuous and so intermingled as to be practically indivisible that NSP 
properly applies. NSP provides a judicially manageable way for trial 
courts to adjudicate certain pollution-coverage disputes when it is diffi-
cult to determine when an "event" or "occurrence" or "damage" giving 
rise to legal liability has occurred. NSP does not establish hard and fast 
rules; it offers a practical solution in the face of uncertainty. 
120. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 
1212,1223 (6th Cir. 1980) (concluding that "bodily injury" includes asbestos inha-
lation); see also Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 523 
N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994). 
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Asbestos produces injury as a consequence of inhalation.
121 
This injury is compounded by cumulative exposure and inhala-
tion. 122 Different courts have enunciated four main (and some-
times conflicting) standards for determining when a eGL carrier is 
obligated on these claims.123 
1. Exposure 
In cases involving exposure to asbestos or other hazardous ma-
terial, courts have found liability insurance triggered when the 
claimant was exposed to conditions alleged to have caused the in-
jury.124 A leading asbestos coverage case employing the exposure 
trigger is Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 
Inc. 125 In addition to being decided on a wave of 1980s coverage 
litigation, Forty-Eight Insulations proved to be quite influential with 
other courts in its adoption of the exposure trigger. It was also in-
fluential in its decision to prorate the relative responsibilities of in-
surers and policyholder for external exposure to asbestos accord-
ing to the respective time policies that were in effect or on the basis 
that a policyholder had chosen not to purchase available cover-
126 age. 
2. Manifestation or Discovery 
Occasionally courts have concluded that applicable insurance 
coverage for insidious bodily injury is to be determined by the time 
the injury is "manifested" or becomes physically tangible and ob-
servable. 127 In some instances, courts have conditioned "trigger" on 
121. See Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1216 (noting that courts have con-
cluded that the initial exposure to asbestos is an "occurrence"). 
122. See Northern States Power Co., 523 N.W.2d at 664. 
123. See Doherty, supra note 111, at 258; see also Jerry B. Edmonds et aI., 
Trigger of CGL Coverage in the Environmental Context: Perspective of Insurers' Counse~ 
28 GoNZ. L. REv. 523, 537-48 (1992-93) (providing detailed explanation of each 
theory). 
124. See, e.g., Hancock Lab., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 
1985); Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1981); Insurance 
Co. ofN. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980). 
125. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980). 
126. See, e.g., Gulf Chern. & Metallurgical Corp. v. Associated Metals & Min-
erals Corp., 1 F.3d 365, 371 (5th Cir. 1993); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco 
Corp., 765 F.2d 1543, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985); Ducre v. Executive Officers of Haller 
Marine, Inc., 752 F.2d 976, 992 (5th Cir. 1985); Porter v. American Optical Corp., 
633 F.2d 1128, 1145 (5th Cir. 1981). 
127. See, e.g., Mraz v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 
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when a condition was capable of being discovered or diagnosed, 
even though it was not apparent to the casual observer or to the 
claimant. 128 For example, the district court opinion in American 
Home Products Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance CO./29 which pur-
ported to apply an "injury-in-fact" trigger in a case involving drug 
product liability, in essence made the purported injury trigger a 
manifestation trigger by using as the operative date for determin-
ing insurance applicability the date when the drug-related disease 
became reasonably capable of medical diagnosis. 130 The Second 
Circuit modified the district court opinion by eliminating the lower 
court's requirement that injury be diagnosable and compensable 
within the policy period. 131 The Second Circuit found that this 
would tend to make the injury trigger operate like a manifestation 
trigger and could unfairly defeat coverage, particularly with insidi-
d · I . h b 132 ous lsease calms suc as as estos. 
3. Injury-In-Fact or Actual Injury Trigger 
An injury-in-fact, or actual injury approach, makes the CGL in-
surer responsible for coverage where the evidence suggests that 
some injury actually occurred during particular policy periods. 133 
For example, coverage is triggered by a showing that a real, but 
undiscovered, injury affected the claimant prior to the time injury 
was physically manifest or detectable.134 
1986); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 
1982). 
128. See Doherty, supra note 111, at 257. 
129. 565 F. Supp. 1485 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
130. See id. 
131. See American Home Prod. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 748 F.2d 760, 
762 (2dCir.1984). 
132. See id. 
133. See Doherty, supra note 111, at 257. 
134. See, e.g., Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 894, 917 (Haw. 
1994) (stating that "proof of the actual onset of injury with precision is not neces-
sary"); SCSC v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1995); Industrial 
Steel Container v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 399 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1987); see also Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 
1194 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that "the plain meaning of the terms of the CGL pol-
icy provided that a policy was triggered by an injury-in-fact during the policy pe-
riod"). The Stonewall court continued, applying New York law, "In the pending 
case, we decide only that both states would rule that, at least where the evidence 
establishes a progressive bodily disease, with injury-in-fact recurring throughout 
the disease process, all policies in effect at any time during that process are trig-
gered." [d. at 1197. 
Under its particular factual situation the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted 
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4. Triple Trigger or Continuous Trigger 
Perhaps the most commonly adopted trigger is a hybrid that 
finds coverage activated by exposure, manifestation, or undetected, 
but alleged, injury. m Because the other three triggers are em-
ployed, this analysis is sometimes referred to as a triple trigger.
IS6 
Since all insurers are implicated by the risk from exposure through 
manifestation, this approach is also referred to as a continuous 
trigger. ls7 The Keene\S8 decision is the first and best known of the 
continuous trigger cases and has been influential in many of the 
subsequent decisions adopting this viewpoint. ls9 
H. Insurer Liability under a "Triggered" Policy for Continuing Injury 
Once insurance coverage is "triggered" by an identifiable 
event and found applicable, the insurer continues to be responsi-
ble for ongoing injury and for the ongoing cost of injury even 
though such injury and cost extend well beyond the policy period 
during which the injury first took place.l40 The policy language 
providing coverage for injury "during the policy period" has been 
this approach to "occurrence" policies in its decision in Northern States Power Co. v. 
Fidelity and Cas. Co. of New York, 523 N.W.2d 657, 664 (Minn. 1994) (stating that 
damages which have occurred over multiple policy periods should be presumed 
to be "continuous from the point of the first damage to the point of discovery or 
cleanup" and that such damage merges "into one continuing occurrence"). But 
see also, SCSC v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1985); Domtar, Inc. 
v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1997). 
135. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d lO34 (D.C. Cir. 
1981). 
136. See Doherty, supra note Ill, at 257. 
137. See id. 
138. See Keene Corp. 667 F.2d at 1034. 
139. SeeJEFFREYW. STEMPEL, INfERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACfS § 3.2, 
at 865-66 (1994); see, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Horne Ins. Co., 794 F.2d 710, 714 n.6 
(D.C. Cir. 1986); ACANDS, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968,972 (3d 
Cir. 1985); Lac D'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee. v. American Horne Assurance Co., 
613 F. Supp. 1549, 1556 (D.N]. 1985); Montrose Chern. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 
913 P.2d 878, 898-99 (Cal. 1995); Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & 
Sur. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 701 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Trustees of Tufts Univ. v. 
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 616 N.E.2d 68, 74 (Mass. 1993); Owens-Illinois, Inc. 
v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 981 (N]. 1994);J.H. France Refractories Co. v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 507 (Pa. 1993) ("Every insurer which was on the 
risk at any time during the development of a claimant's asbestos-related disease 
has an obligation to indemnify"). Illinois is said to have a "double trigger," which 
means that coverage is triggered for asbestos claims against the policyholder on 
the basis of both exposure and manifestation. See Zurich Ins. Co. v. Rayrnark In-
dus., Inc., 514 N.E.2d 150 (Ill. 1987). 
140. See ANDERSON, supra note 59, at 7. See also Domtar, 563 N.W.2d at 733. 
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held not to limit the insurer's responsibility for such continuing in-
jury. 141 Subsequent damages flowing from the injury taking place 
during the policy period are covered along with damages accruing 
during the policy period.142 
A cogent exposition of this conclusion is found in a 1993 deci-
sion of the New Jersey Superior Court.14~ The court squarely as-
141. SeeDomtar, 563 N.W.2d at 733. 
142. See id. (finding the triggered policy fully responsible for ongoing losses 
related to covered occurrence until the policy limits are exhausted); California 
Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 193 Cal. Rptr. 461, 469 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) 
("[IJn a 'one occurrence' case involving continuous, progressive and deteriorat-
ing damage, the carrier in whose policy period the damage first becomes appar-
ent remains on the risk until the damage is finally and totally complete, notwith-
standing a policy provision which purports to limit the coverage solely to those 
accidents/occurrences within the time parameters of the stated policy term."); see 
also Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1202-03 (2d 
Cir. 1995) (applying New York law, where the court concluded that after the in-
surance coverage was triggered and found applicable, the insurer continued to be 
responsible for the ongoing cost of injury even though such costs extended well 
beyond the policy period where the injury first took place); Chern star, Inc. v. Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co., 41 F.3d 429, 436-37 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying California law 
and holding that when CGL property damage coverage was triggered, the insurer 
remained responsible for continuing deterioration of the claimant's property due 
to the insured's wrongful conduct); American Home Assurance Co. v. Libbey-
Owens-Ford Co., 786 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1986) (claiming to apply Massachusetts law 
but considering authority from numerous jurisdictions and finding insurer of 
maker of defective windows used in the John Hancock building liable for all cov-
ered damages even if the damages continued past the end of the policy period 
but provided for apportionment of covered and uncovered property damage 
claims); Marathon Flint Oil Co. v. American States Ins. Co., 810 F. Supp. 850, 852 
(E.D. Mich. 1992) (holding all triggered insurers responsible for ongoing injuries 
caused by occurrence); Mayv. Maryland Cas. Corp., 792 F. Supp. 63, 65 (E.D. Mo. 
1992) (concluding that the insurer on the risk at the time of the insured's first 
acts of sexual abuse was responsible for the ongoing damage from continuing in-
appropriate behavior by the insured towards the claimant); Transamerica Ins. Co. 
v. Bellefonte Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 935, 939 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (finding in coverage 
disputes between successive insurers of the drugmaker accused of manufacturing 
a product causing birth defects, each triggered insurer responsible for ongoing 
damages from the occurrence). 
143. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 625 A.2d 1 (NJ. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1993). Although this decision was reversed in part on other grounds by 
the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Superior Court opinion remains sound. See 
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1994). The Su-
preme Court decision altered the Superior Court decision regarding apportion-
ment of insurer responsibility, but agreed generally with the statement quoted in 
the text that a triggered CGL insurer standing alone is responsible for the full 
consequences of covered bodily injury or property damage even if the injury con-
tinues beyond the policy period. [d. at 990. The court held that although the "all 
sums" language of the policy does not preclude allocation, policy language pro-
viding coverage for injury "during the policy period" cannot be invoked to limit 
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sessed the gravamen of the insurers' allocation-based defense and 
found it incorrect in both contract and equity.144 
Defendants contend that each insurer is required to pay 
only a prorated share of 0-l's liability. They argue that 
once an insurer's coverage is triggered, its share would be 
determined by the duration of a claimant's exposure dur-
ing its policy period in comparison to the entire duration 
of exposure to the insured's products. 
We disagree with this contention. However phrased, 
the insurers' argument is based on their characterization 
of asbestos-related diseases as consisting of a multitude of 
discrete injuries to the lung tissue. That description of 
the disease process defies reality. We declined to rely 
upon it in determining the triggering event of insurance 
coverage. It has no greater efficacy in determining the 
extent of coverage. In our view, questions of the trigger 
of coverage and the extent of coverage are inextricably in-
tertwined. We hold that once an insurer's coverage is triggered, 
it is liable Jor the Jull extent oj the insured's liability up to the pol-
icy limits, but subject to the "other insurance" clauses con-
tained in the insuring agreement. 
Each policy has a built-in trigger of coverage. There is 
nothing in the policies that provides for a reduction in 
the insurer's liability if an injury occurs only in part of a 
policy period. The policies cover 0-l's entire liability 
once they are triggered. For an insurer to be only par-
tially liable for an injury that occurred in part during its 
policy period would deprive the insured of its objectively 
reasonable eX.fectations pertaining to the coverage for 
which it paid. I 
The California Supreme Court reached the same conclusion: l46 
[W] e have reviewed the rationale of ... [other California 
cases] which, together with the weight of more recent 
authorities, conclude that where successive CGL policies 
have been purchased, bodily injury and property damage 
that is continuing or progressively deteriorating through-
insurer responsibility; subsequent damages flowing from injury taking place dur-
ing the policy period are covered along with damages accruing during the policy 
period. Id. at 995-96. 
144. See Owens-Illinois, 625 A.2d at 27. 
145. See id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
146. See Montrose Chern. Corp. of Cal. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P. 2d 878, 
901-02 (Cal. 1995). 
HeinOnline -- 24 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 542 1998
542 WILliAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24 
out more than one policy period is potentially covered by 
all policies in effect during those periods. 147 
In an even more recent decision, a California appellate court 
pointed out the illogical result of the insurers' position on cover-
age of the continuing injury:148 
In any event, the insurers' approach would essentially 
render the asbestos manufacturers' insurance coverage il-
lusory, for by the time asbestos diseases caused detectable 
impairments (in the 1970's), insurance companies ceased 
issuing policies that adequately covered asbestos-related 
disease. Hence, the insurers' theory would deprive the 
manufacturers of coverage for product liability injuries of 
which they were unaware during the policy periods .... 
There is nothing in the policies for a reduction of the in-
surer's liabili'X if an injury occurs only in part during a 
policy period. 49 
Referring to the prior California Supreme Court decision, this 
court found that case to support the proposition that an insurer 
may be liable for the entire loss up to the policy limits even though 
the continuing injury may extend over several policy periods: 
Although each policy is triggered only by the occur-
rence of an injury during the policy period, once a policy 
is triggered, the policy obligates the insurer to pay all 
sums for which the policyholder becomes liable. There is 
nothing in the policies limiting the scope of coverage to 
that portion of a continuous injury that developed during 
the policy period .... No matter what the tort liability of 
an asbestos manufacturer-whether joint and several, 
proportionate to fault or proportionate to market share-
the indemnity obligations of its insurers are as set forth in 
part 2a above: to respond in full to the policyholder's li-
ability obligations up to the policy's limits, subject to ap-
portionment pursuant to "other insurance" clauses. 15o 
147. See id. 
148. See Armstrong World Indus. Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 690, 705. (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
149. [d. at 706 (quoting Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 
1034, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (emphasis in original». 
150. [d. at 707, 709, 712 (emphasis in original). Regarding the insurer's re-
sponsibility for continuing damage first taking place during the policy period, 
Professor Abraham notes: 
Would it be correct to say that each policy is liable only for the damage 
caused by the [hazardous] waste which first caused injury during the pe-
HeinOnline -- 24 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 543 1998
1998] THE TALE OF A TAIL 543 
Although permlttlng the policyholder to exhaust coverage 
available for multiple years poses some risk of initially inequitable 
burdens, the potential inequity is remedied by simply giving the 
implicated insurers rights of contribution vis-a.-vis one another. 151 
This permits the insurers to settle accounts as to coverage respon-
sibility without forcing the policyholder to receive less insurance 
than it bargained for, and paid for, and without forcing the policy-
holder to shoulder the financial burden of waiting for payment. 
Insurers are to some extent in the banking business. 152 In addition, 
if insurer responsibility (either occurrence or claims-made) is di-
minished by an allocation scheme, the policyholder could be over-
burdened while insurers with available policy limits remaining 
could be underburdened.153 This result seems at least as problem-
riod the policy was in force? That approach would most closely track the 
language of the pre-1986 standard CGL, which insures, in effect, against 
liability for damages because of bodily injury or property damage that 
occurs during the policy period. Thus, as long as some injury first oc-
curred during a given policy period, the policy in effect during that pe-
riod would be liable for all the injury ultimately resulting from that 
waste, even if some of the injury also occurred later. This, after all, is the 
approach that liability policies apply to ordinary injuries: an insured who 
injures a victim in an auto accident in 1995, for example, is covered by her 1995 
liability policy for all damages resulting, even if the victim suffers pain and incurs 
medical expense in 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998. Any other approach would 
be chaotic. 
Could such a trigger be effectively applied, however, in the hazardous 
waste setting? Waste may leak from a single drum or group of drums for 
several years; or waste may be dumped directly onto the ground over 
several years. Once this material mixes together and begins to cause 
damage, the portion of damage caused by each separate discharge or 
discharges in each year normally cannot be disaggregated from the total 
damage at the site. In the absence of the proof required, is each policy 
immune from liability, or is each policy liable jointly and severally for all 
the damage? The latter approach entitles the insured to "stack" the lim-
its of liability available from all triggered policies-possibly underbur-
dening some policies and overburdening others. 
See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAw AND REGUlATION 481-82 (2d ed. 1995) 
(emphasis added). 
151. See ABRAHAM, supra note 150, at 119, 122 (discussing contribution 
among triggered policies). 
152. See ANDREW TOBIAS, THE INVISIBLE BANKERS 15 (1982). Compared to 
even large commercial policyholders, CGL insurers are in a better position to ad-
vance funds and equalize contributions among insurers at a later date. See id. See 
also text infra at notes 273-76. 
153. See John H. Mathias et ai., Allocation: JH. France and the Right to Select 
from Multiple Triggered Policies, 4 COVERAGE 19, 21-22 (1994) (noting that allocation 
schemes other than joint and several liability are unfair to insureds). 
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atic as broad 'Joint and several" liability.154 
1. Allocation Among Multiple Insurers 
Since an insurance policy is, after all, a contract, the basic 
principle applied by the courts is, where possible, to give effect to 
the appropriately expressed intent of the parties.155 Thus, in the 
first instance, a court will look to the language of the respective 
policies for guidance as to whether the separate provisions can be 
meshed together, each in accordance with its own terms.156 If one 
policy says that its coverage is to be primary, and the other says that 
its coverage is to be excess, the court will give effect to that 
choice. 157 The only relevant language, in the eGL context, is usu-
ally found in the "other insurance" condition. 15B Because of the 
ISO decision not to include an express "meshing" provision each 
eGL insurer points the finger at the other eGL insurers. 159 
As a result, where two or more eGL policies are implicated on 
the same risk the respective "other insurance" clauses are often ir-
reconcilable and cancel each other out. 160 In this situation courts 
have defined their responsibility as finding an equitable solution. 161 
This search for an equitable solution applies both where there is an 
occurrence which triggers one policy and where there is an occur-
154. See STEMPEL, supra note 139, at 856-66 (finding the '10int and several" 
liability description a misnomer because no triggered insurer is ever liable for 
more than its policy limits absent bad faith while ajointly liable tortfeasor may be 
responsible for 100% of the liability even if it is only 1 % at fault). 
155. See Garrett G. Gillespie, The Allocation of Coverage Responsibility Among 
Multiple Triggered Commercial General Liability Policies in Environmental Cases: Life Af 
ter Owens-Illinois, 15 VA. ENVIL. LJ. 525, 528-29 (1996) (discussing methods by 
which a court may resolve differences in the expressed intent of the parties). 
156. See id. at 526. 
157. See Drake v. Ryan, 514 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Minn. 1994) (observing that 
standard automobile insurance provides primary coverage to the insured for driv-
ing certain vehicles and excess coverage when an insured is driving a non-owned 
insured vehicle). 
158. It is to be noted that this provision provides for allocation among mul-
tiple insurers, not among insurers and the insured. See id. at 790. 
159. See Brooke Jackson, Liability Insurance for Pollution Claims: Avoiding a 
Litigation Waste Land, 26 TuLSA LJ. 209 (1990) (noting that such finger-pointing is 
often done in an attempt to share the loss with other insurers). 
160. See Fire Ins. Exch. v. American States Ins. Co., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 135, 138 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (stating in context of subcontractor and general contractor, 
"other insurance" clauses canceled each other out); Robert F. Kane, Indemnifica-
tion and Additional Insured Provision: A Primer, 6 COVERAGE 1, 17 (1996). 
161. See Hillman & DeYoung, supra note 105, at 306; Northern States Power 
Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 523 N.W.2d 657, 660 (Minn. 1994). 
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rence which triggers multiple policies. 162 As reviewed above, the 
courts have stated clearly that, in the first instance, the policy for 
the year during which injury occurred is implicated, and is liable 
up to the cap limits of the policy for injury in that year and all re-
sulting injury in subsequent years caused by the same occurrence.163 
In this second situation, each insurance policy for each triggered 
year is potentially implicated.
l64 
Assuming adequate proof of the 
injury, the insured should be able to proceed against the insurer at 
risk on that first year and exhaust the limits of that coverage, and 
then, assuming an ability to prove resultant injury in subsequent 
years, proceed to the next year's insurer, and so on. According to 
one court, the insured may choose which insurer to pursue.165 The 
insurers' remedy is allocation between themselves under the "other 
insurance" provision, but not against the insured. l66 
Where there is a series of continuing "occurrences" year by 
year, the situation may change. In this situation, each new year is a 
new insurance experience. This was the result arrived at by the 
court in the well-known Forty-Eight Insulations case. 167 The claimed 
basis of liability in this case was "failure on the part of the manufac-
turer to warn asbestos workers and other ultimate users of its prod-
ucts that asbestos was a dangerous product which, if inhaled, could 
cause an early death from cancer or other disease."I68 "[A]sbestosis 
is a progressive disease. It ordinarily takes years of breathing asbes-
tos fibers for asbestosis to occur .... The more asbestos fibers a 
worker inhales, the more quickly a worker will contract asbesto-
sis.,,169 The court in this decision described the progressive and 
162. See Davis J. Howard, "Contiguous Trigger" Liability: Application to Toxic 
Waste Cases and Impact on Number of "Occurrences, "22 TORT & INS. LJ. 624, 624-27 
(explaining the distinction between single and continuing occurrences). 
163. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 23 F.3d 617, 626 (2d Cir. 
1993) (noting that an asbestos injury occurred at the point of installation, but not 
beyond that point); see also Howard, supra note 162, at 625 ("If injury and damage 
are deemed to occur at a single point in time, only one CGL policy will arguably 
provide coverage."). 
164. See Howard, supra note 162, at 625 (noting that injuries developing 
over a period of years may implicate or trigger two or more CGL policies). 
165. See Keene Corp. v. Insurance Corp. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1041 
(D.C. Cir. 1981). 
166. See ABRAHAM, supra note 150, at 121 (noting that the proper remedy is a 
contribution action among the different insurers). 
167. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 
1212, 1224 (6th Cir. 1980). 
168. Id. at 1213. 
169. Id. at 1214. 
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cumulative nature of the injury involved. 170 Based on the foregoing 
facts the insured urged that indemnity costs be allocated on the ba-
sis of the number of years that a worker inhaled asbestos fibers, and 
the court agreed. 
171 
The critical importance of the distinction between an 
"occurrence" caused by an unknown quantity and quality of events, 
as opposed to identifiable, discrete events, is illustrated by recent 
decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court involving environ-
1 11 ' 172 menta po utIon. 
The first such case is Narthern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. 
Co. of New York. 175 The issue before the Court was the allocation of 
damages between multiple insurers on the risk for pollution clean-up 
170. See id. 
The problem is that tiny asbestos particles can become airborne when 
asbestos is mined and processed, when asbestos materials are used at a 
construction or other site, and when old buildings containing asbestos 
are demolished. When these asbestos particles become airborne, a 
number of them are inhaled by persons in the area. The asbestos parti-
cles are deposited in the lungs. If, over the years, enough asbestos particles 
are inhaled, they can cause a variety of pulmonary diseases. Medical sci-
ence is not certain exactly how these diseases develop, but there is uni-
versal agreement that excessive inhalation of asbestos can and does re-
sult in disease. These asbestos-caused diseases include mesothelioma, 
broncheogenic carcinoma (lung cancer), and asbestosis. 
[d. at 1214 (emphasis added). 
Cumulative disease cases are different from the ordinary accident or dis-
ease situation. First, the underlying theory of tort liability is that the as-
bestos manufacturers continually failed to warn the asbestos workers and 
that, as a result of this, continuous breathing of asbestos particles allowed 
asbestosis to progress to the point where it caused death or injury." 
[d. at 1219. 
[d. 
171. See id. at 1225. 
Forty-Eight has urged that indemnity costs can be allocated by the num-
ber of years that a worker inhaled asbestos fibers. By embracing the ex-
posure theory, we have agreed. There is no reason why this same theory 
should not apply to defense costs. The different insurance companies 
will pro-rate defense costs among themselves. It is reasonable to treat 
Forty-Eight as an insurer for those periods of time that it had no insur-
ance coverage. 
The court also recognized that an insurer should be off the risk for years where 
there was no inhalation of asbestos fibers-the burden of such showing being 
upon the insurer. See id. "Accordingly, where an insurer can show that no expo-
sure to asbestos manufactured by its insured took place during certain years, then 
that insurer cannot be liable for those years." [d. 
172. See SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 318 (Minn. 
1995); Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 523 N.W.2d 
657,658 (Minn. 1994). 
173. 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994). 
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costs.174 In this case the court was not required to resolve any possi-
ble proration against the insured. 175 NSP had entered into a consent 
order with the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency in 1988 under 
which NSP was required to pay $1,600,000 in response costs, to-
gether with interest, and further monitoring costs of approximately 
$40,000 per year. 176 NSP then brought a declaratory judgment action 
against thirteen companies from which it had purchased liability in-
surance between the years 1946 and 1985.177 NSP eventually setded 
with all of the insurers except one, the St. Paul.178 Five policies, all in 
the standard CGL format, were at issue.179 Each contained the stan-
dard "other insurance" condition seeking to make the policy excess 
over any other valid and collectible insurance.18o NSP argued that all 
of the carriers were joindy and severally liable, and that the trial 
court should allocate damages between the carriers "pro rata by lim-
its.,,181 The supreme court spoke of NSP's argument as follows: NSP 
based this argument on the assumption that, under Minnesota law all 
policies were "triggered" if they were on the risk at any time during 
which damage occurred, and damage occurred continuously from 
the date of operations to the present.182 In an accompanying foot-
note, the court explained that "[a] policy is 'triggered' if the policy 
provides some coverage for damages.,,183 The trial court had held 
that St. Paul's "other insurance" clause did not conflict with those in 
the other policies and that, thus, the St. Paul policies provided excess 
coverage only.184 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the St. 
Paul policies provided primary coverage, and holding further that 
"damages were to be allocated among the carriers in proportion to 
the injuries that occurred during each policy period .... ,,185 The 
only issues on appeal to the Supreme Court were the "other insur-
ance" and the allocation issues.186 The court said: 
In this case, however, we are not faced with the question 
174. See id. at 658. 
175. See id. at 661. 
176. See id. at 659. 
177. See id. 
178. See id. 
179. See id. 
180. See id. at 660. 
181. Id. (footnote omitted). 
182. Id. at 660. 
183. Id. at n.3. 
184. See id. at 660. 
185. Id. 
186. See id. 
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of whether these claims are "damages," but with how to al-
locate liability between insurers. This is a very different is-
sue, one which may require a more flexible approach. As 
with all insurance contract-related issues, courts must con-
sider many factors when deciding this issue, including the 
policy language, parties' intent or reasonable expecta-
tions, canons of construction and public policy.187 
The court then went on to review the four different 'trigger' 
theories to be found in the decisions of courts in other states: 
[T]he "exposure" rule, whereby only those policies in ef-
fect when the claimant or property was exposed to haz-
ardous materials are triggered; the "manifestation" rule, 
whereby only those policies in effect when the injury or 
damage was discovered are triggered; the "continuous 
trigger" where the policies in effect at the time of expo-
sure, the time of manifestation, and all the time in be-
tween are triggered; and the "actual injury" or "injury-in-
fact" trigger, whereby only those policies in effect when 
damage occurred are triggered .... 
Minnesota follows the "actual injury" or "injury-in-fact" theory 
to determine which policies have been triggered by an occurrence 
causing damages for which an insured is liable. 188 
Noting that the choice of "trigger theory" is related to the issue 
of allocation, the court held a "pro rata by limits" allocation method 
to be inconsistent with the actual injury "trigger theory.,,189 The court 
stated: 
The essence of the actual injury trigger theory is that each 
insurer is held liable for only those damages which oc-
curred during its policy period; no insurer is held liable 
for damages outside its policy period. Where the policy 
periods do not overlap, therefore, the insurers are con-
secutively, not concurrently liable .... 
The question therefore becomes, how maya court al-
locate damages consistent with the "actual injury" trigger 
theory? One option would be to apportion the damages 
as proven; in other words, each policy would cover only 
those damages that are allocable to harm which occurred 
during the policy period. This is the approach followed 
by the court of appeals in this case .... A second option 
187. See id. at 66l. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
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would allocate damages pro rata by each insurer's "time 
th . k ,,190 on ens. 
549 
The court then indicated its preference for allocation of dam-
ages "as proven," but noted the difficulties of proof in the case be-
fore it: 
The primary advantage of the first option, allocating 
damages to each policy "as proven," is that it is completely 
consistent with CGL policy language limiting liability to 
damages incurred "during the policy period." Practically, 
however, this option is unattractive given the scientific 
complexity of the issues involved, the extended period of 
time over which damages may have occurred before dis-
covery, and the number of parties potentially involved. As 
one commentator has noted: [H] olding each policy to 
cover only that portion of the insured's liability that is al-
locable to the harm which occurred in the year in ques-
tion ... may be theoretically satisfying, but will almost 
always be infeasible. Given the progressive nature of the 
environmental harms in question, finding the facts neces-
sary to apply this approach usually would be administra-
tively difficult, scientifically impossible, or both. Conse-
quently, the real issue is which approach to apply when 
for all practical purposes the bodily injury or property 
damage suffered during different policy periods is indi-
visible .... 
. . . We have already concluded that the contamination of 
the groundwater should be regarded as a continuous 
process in which the property damage is evenly distrib-
uted over the period of time from the first contamination 
to the end of the last triggered policy (or self-insured) pe-
riod, and we have also held that the total amount of the 
property damage should be allocated to the various poli-
cies in proportion to the period of time each was on the 
. k 191 ns . 
The court observed that significant public policy reasons sup-
ported its conclusion: "[f]inally, as a public policy matter, this court 
cannot ignore the enormous difficulty insureds would face if, as is 
generally the case, they had the burden of proving the amount of 
damages for each policy at issue.,,192 
190. [d. (citation omitted). 
191. [d. at 663 (emphasis added). 
192. [d. (emphasis in original). 
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While indicating an intention to allocate by "time on the risk" 
on the facts before it, the court specifically noted that: "[ w] hile such 
an allocation scheme is attractive for its simplicity, we recognize that 
damages are by nature fact-dependent and that trial courts must be 
given the flexibility to apportion them in a manner befitting each 
case.,,193 With profound insight, the Minnesota Supreme Court con-
cluded by noting: "We do not expect that this case will be the "last 
word" in this area. Environmental liability insurance law, like any 
other area of law, will have to develop over time and trial courts must 
be flexible in responding to new fact situations.,,194 
In the second case sese earp. v. Allied Mutual Insurance eo.,195 
the Minnesota Supreme Court had occasion again to consider CGL 
liability policies as applied to a case of environmental pollution.196 
SCSC had brought suit to determine its insurers' obligations under 
liability insurance policies for costs incurred as a result of soil and 
groundwater contamination.197 For a period from 1976 to 1988, 
SCSC had operated a dry cleaning and laundry business at the site in 
question. 198 As part of that business, SCSC stored, repackaged, and 
delivered a chemical used in the dry cleaning business. 199 This 
chemical having percolated into the groundwater, SCSC was re-
quired by the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency to develop and 
pay for remedial work. 200 The jury concluded that the escape of the 
chemical was due to a significant spill that arose in 1977.201 The trial 
court issued an order that every policy in effect during and after the 
1977 spill was triggered "vertically.,,202 One of the insurers involved 
argued that the trial court should have allocated damages on the ba-
sis of "time on the risk," and should have allocated damages to SCSC 
for uninsured years. 203 The jury, however, had found that the dam-
age arose in 1977, and that the damages were not divisible for other 
years.204 The trial court decided to trigger the relevant insurance 
policies "vertically" by year, beginning with the policies in effect in 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 665. 
195. 536 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1995). 
196. See id. at 307. 
197. See id. at 308. 
198. See id. at 308-09. 
199. See id. at 308. 
200. See id. at 309. 
201. See id. at 310. 
202. See id. 
203. See id. at 317. 
204. See id. 
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1977.205 The Supreme Court, however, determined otherwise: 
Under the facts of the present case, we reject the multiple-
year vertical triggering approach taken by the trial court. 
We also decline Tower's invitation to apply NSP's pro rata 
by time on the risk triggering approach. In NSP, the 
damages occurred over multiple policy periods, and with-
out evidence to the contrary, we concluded that such 
damages must be assumed to be continuous. Our deci-
sion in NSP was an equitable decision based upon the 
complexity of proving in which policy periods covered 
property damage arose. In the present case, however, we 
have sufficient evidence indicating that the damage arose 
from a single event in 1977 .... Based on these findings, 
the only covered "occurrence" was the 1977 spill. The 
continual leaching of the chemicals from the soil into the 
groundwater did result in damages to SCSC because of 
property damage. However, only Allied's 1977 $100,000 
primary policy and Tower's 1977 $1,000,000 excess policy 
. d 206 are tnggere .... 
551 
An even more recent case, Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Insurance 
CO.,207 dealt with another problem arising out of the standard CGL 
policy form and environmental pollution.208 Domtar challenged the 
decision of the trial court allocating to Domtar the responsibility for 
damages to the site during periods when Domtar did not have insur-
ance coverage.209 Domtar operated a plant on the site in question 
from 1924 through 1929 and from 1934 to 1948.210 The plant was 
closed in 1948 and sold in 1955.211 The Minnesota Pollution Control 
Agency initiated a Request for Response Action against Domtar in 
1991.212 Between 1956 and 1970 Domtar purchased primary and ex-
f ral . 213 Th ·d f . cess coverage rom seve Insurers. ere was no eVl ence 0 In-
surance coverage before 1956 or after 1970.214 The jury found that 
pollution damage commenced in 1933 and that some damage oc-
205. See id. at 3lO. 
206. [d. at 318. 
207. 552 N.W.2d 738 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), afj'd in part, reu'd in part, 563 
N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1997). 
208. See id., at 742. 
209. See id. 
210. See id. 
211. See id. 
212. See id. 
213. See id. at 743. 
214. See id. 
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curred during the years insurance policies were in force. 215 The trial 
court directed that the remediation costs be allocated pro rata across 
the number of years 1933 through 19ge16 Domtar, then, was held 
liable for damages allocated to the years from 1933 to 1956 and after 
1970.217 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.218 
The court of appeals relied on the fact that the supreme court in 
Narthem States Power Co., cited two cases, in which both courts allo-
cated a portion of the loss to the insured for self-insured years.219 "In 
sum, by reason of the NSP holding, the insurers do not have respon-
sibility for parts of continuous damage that occurred outside their 
policy periods.,,220 It is important to note that the court emphasized 
the continuing nature of the "occurrences," and that both cases dealt 
only with occurrence policies. The Minnesota Supreme Court re-
cently affirmed the trial court's conclusions regarding the insurer's 
responsibility.221 In so doing, the supreme court gave important fur-
ther guidance on those situations to which NSP and its rebuttable 
evidentiary presumption applies and those to which it does not: 
It is inaccurate to conclude that a CGL insurer is never li-
able for damages occurring outside of the policy period. 
CGL policies come in many forms and it is a mistake to 
read our case law as if the scope of coverage has been re-
solved for all such policies, no matter what their language. 
The proper scope of coverage also will depend on the 
facts of the case. When environmental contamination 
arises from discrete and identifiable events, then the ac-
tual-injury trigger theory allows those policies on the risk 
at the point of initial contamination to pay for all prop-
erty damage that follows. This interpretation of the poli-
cies is in accord with the common understanding of the 
terms "occurrence" or "accident.,,222 
The court explained further: 
It is only in those difficult cases in which property damage 
is both continuous and so intermingled as to be practi-
215. See id. 
216. See id. 
217. See id. 
218. See id. 
219. See id. at 744. 
220. Id. at 745. 
221. See Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 
1997). 
222. Id. at 733 (citation omitted). 
HeinOnline -- 24 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 553 1998
1998] THE TALE OF A TAlL 553 
cally indivisible that NSP properly applies.223 
III. How DOES "TIME ON THE RISK" WORK IN THE LIGHT OF THE 
SHIFT FROM "OCCURRENCE" BASED COVERAGE TO "CLAIMS-MADE" 
COVERAGE IN 1986? 
As noted above, all three Minnesota decisions on environmental 
pollution referenced a rebuttable evidentiary presumption that the 
injuries or "occurrences" occurred in each and every year between. 
the date of the "escape" and the date of the claim, and in sese, dis-
placement of that presumption since there was a discrete identifiable 
event. These cases all dealt with the difficult issue of occurrence cov-
erage for environmental contamination where neither the policy-
holder nor insurers specifically foresaw or underwrote for the legal 
risk posed by later enacted CERCLA.224 Even so, where there was an 
identifiable event, sese and Domtar confirm that the occurrence in-
surers on the risk when that discrete identifiable event occurred are 
responsible for "all sums" liability.225 
When the court did spread responsibility pro rata among insur-
ers, it cited to cases where the insured could have purchased occur-
rence insurance in each and every year of exposure and the failure 
to purchase or have available such insurance coverage represented 
an election by the insured to "go bare," or assume the responsibility 
of an insurer itself for that year or such years.226 
From and after 1986, for many large policyholders "occurrence" 
based coverage was no longer commercially available in amounts of 
any consequence.227 The only available coverage thereafter was 
"claims-made.,,228 How might proration by "time on the risk" work if 
the exposure span began before 1986 and continued into a period 
when only claims-made insurance was available? Consider the fol-
223. Id. 
224. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-675 (1995 & Supp. 1998). 
225. See SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 307 (Minn. 
1995) (involving yearly percolation of chemicals into groundwater); Northern 
States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 523 N.W.2d 657,659 (Minn. 1994): 
Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1997). 
226. See Northern States Power Co., 523 N.W.2d at 659; Domtar, 563 N.W.2d at 
733; Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212 (6th 
Cir. 1980). 
227. See Jim L. Julian, Insurance Coverage for Environmental Clean-up Costs Un-
der Comprehensive General Liability Policies, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK LJ. 57, 58-9 
(1996) (discussing the insurance industry'S switch from occurrence to claims-
made policies). 
228. See id. 
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lowing example: Suppose that a substantial environmental spill oc-
curred in 1981 and that a claim was asserted for injury attributable to 
that spill in 1990. Suppose further, that the insured had 
"occurrence" based coverage in the amount of $1 million for each of 
the five years 1981-1985. Suppose further still, that the insured had 
"claims-made" coverage for each of the years 1986-1990, likewise in 
the amount of $1 million for each such year. Assume that the rebut-
table evidentiary presumption is not disproved. How should alloca-
tion by "time on the risk" be determined? 
Following a recently asserted argument,229 the "occurrence" in-
surers might take the position that the period of years over which the 
proration is to be calculated is ten-namely, 1981-1990. The "claims-
made" insurers would without a doubt take the position that the 
policies for the years 1986-89 are not triggered, and therefore are in 
no way on the risk, since no claim was asserted within the term of the 
policy in each of those years. The "claims-made" insurer for the year 
1990 might concede, in the face of an appropriate fact-finding that 
the 1990 policy was triggered. But the 1990 insurer would likely 
point to the newly included "other insurance" clause inserted in the 
"claims-made" policies which provides that the "claims-made" cover-
age is to be excess over any other available insurance (i.e. available to 
fill in for triggered policy exhaustion, gaps, insolvencies etc.). Forty-
Eight Insulations and Nmthern States Power Co. only involved 
"occurrence" policies.230 Would it be appropriate to treat the claims-
made policies from 1986-90 as though they were "occurrence" poli-
cies, knowing that the trigger is entirely different and that the limits 
which the policyholder purchased from 1986 to 1989 would not be 
available, even on an excess basis, for a claim first asserted in 1990? 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this issue in the 
recent Stonewall decision.231 This was a case of asbestos inhalation 
229. See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1204 
(2d Cir. 1995). In Stonewall, the court directed proration against the insured for 
periods where the insured could have purchased applicable insurance but failed 
to do so. For periods when it was impossible for the insured to purchase applica-
ble insurance the court directed no proration against the insured. See discussion 
at note 231 infra. 
230. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212, 
1216 (6th Cir. 1980); Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity and Cas. Co. of N.Y., 
523 N.W.2d 657,664 (Minn. 1994). 
231. See Stonewall, 73 F.3d at 1202-04. In Stonewall, the court discussed a va-
riety of factors affecting an insurer's pro rata share of damages. See id. See also dis-
cussion at note 235 infra. 
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over a series ofyears.232 The court had before it, among other issues, 
the question of allocation concerning periods when the insured had 
not purchased insurance.2S5 As to those periods where the insured 
could have purchased applicable occurrence insurance but failed to 
do so, the court directed appropriate proration against the in-
sured.2s4 As to periods after which it became impossible for the in-
sured to purchase applicable insurance, namely after 1985, the court 
modified the lower court decision so as to relieve the insured from 
any proration based on those years after which asbestos insurance 
became unavailable.2s5 The court concluded that adopting the in-
surers' view of proration across the total number of years would leave 
the insured largely uninsured for current claims. 236 
[W]e do not agree with the DistrictJudge's subsidiary rul-
ing that proration-to-the-insured should be applied to 
years after 1985 when asbestos liability insurance was no 
longer available. Judge Martin applied proration-to-the-
insured even after 1985. His rationale was that NGe had 
"bargained away coverage by accepting asbestos exclusion 
clauses." We think that is not a realistic view of the situa-
tion. There is no reason to believe that any bargaining oc-
curred with respect to the asbestos exclusion clauses. 
Moreover, we note that judges who have endorsed pro-
ration-to-the-insured have done so only to oblige a manu-
facturer to accept a proportionate share of a risk that it 
elected to assume, either by declining to purchase avail-
able insurance or by purchasing what turned out to be an 
insufficient amount of insurance .... Judge Martin's opin-
ion appears to be the only one applying proration-to-the-
insured to years when asbestos liability insurance was no 
232. See id. at 1190. The underlying claims asserted in Stonewall included 
both asbestosis and asbestos-induced cancer claims. See id. With respect to these 
latter claims the district court had held that this type of injury occurred only at or 
shortly after inhalation of asbestos fibers and that only those policies in effect dur-
ing that limited time period were triggered. See id. The circuit court remanded 
this aspect of the decision of the lower court for further consideration. See id. at 
1219. 
233. See id. at 1187. 
234. See id at 1203. ''When periods of no insurance reflect a decision by an 
actor to assume or retain a risk, as opposed to periods when coverage for a risk is 
not available, to expect the risk-bearer to share in the allocation is reason-
able .... " [d. (citation omitted). 
235. See Stonewall, 73 F.2d at 119l. 
236. See id. at 1193. 
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longer available. 237 
This logic applies at least as forcefully to the situation where the 
insurers forced the substitution of "claims-made" coverage for the 
earlier "occurrence" based coverage. This created the prospective 
unavailability of prorating insurance after 1985, with the possible ex-
ception of one year's proration to the policy in force in the year in 
which the claim was finally asserted, if that policy was not determined 
to be excess. 
Thus, in what appears to be the only reported case where occur-
rence insurers attempted to spread their tail liability into claims-
made years, a federal court rejected the argument in the following 
terms: 
The insurers also argue that to the extent the Court finds 
the "continuous trigger" theory of coverage applies to 
Hatco's claims, Grace could have sought coverage under 
all of the ElL policies in effect from 1981 through 1985. 
This argument is without merit. Coverage under occur-
rence-based policies is triggered by damage resulting dur-
ing the policy period. Coverage under claims-made poli-
cies is dependent only on whether the claim arose during 
the policy period. The continuous trigger theory of cov-
erage is strictly an interpretation of the policy language of 
"occurrence-based" policies that holds coverage under 
multiple policies to be triggered when damage is indivisi-
ble and continuous during multiple policy periods. See 
Section II of this Opinion above. Thus, the continuous 
trigger theory has no application to "claims-made" poli-
cies, under which the occurrence of damage during the 
policy period is irrelevant.238 
The trial court's conundrum in Stonewall, arrived at by applying 
Farly-Eight Insulations literally to the situation where the insurers had 
withdrawn the coverage, is derived from the evidentiary presumption 
that the injury occurred equally in each year from date of injury to 
date of claim.239 This evidentiary presumption was created in the first 
place to aid the insured in overcoming an insurer argument that the 
insured was failing to establish actual injury during the particular 
policy year, and thus failing to establish that such policy was 
237. Id. at 1203-04. 
238. Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 801 F. Supp. 1334, 
1373 n.25 (D.NJ. 1992). 
239. See Stonewall, 73 F.3d at 1191. 
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"triggered" at all. 240 It would be paradoxical for a court to now use 
that judicially created presumption to reduce the insured's already 
"triggered" coverage annually, following the switch in insurance 
forms. If, indeed, the insurer established that there were a new in-
tervening cause, accompanied by new intervening injury, following 
the switch in policy forms, that would be a different case. The Stone-
wall approach241 is not, then, inconsistent with recognition of the 
right of the insurer to change the policy format to "claims-made" 
with respect to risks that first attached after the inception of such 
"claims-made" policy.242 It gives appropriate effect to an insurer deci-
sion to exclude liability for pollution, or require assertion of a claim 
during the policy term as the "trigger" of coverage, but it does not 
allow the insurer to attempt to change, retrospectively, the nature 
and extent of the liability that had already attached under the old 
"occurrence" policy form. 
The trial court's approach suggests possible confusion between 
two very different processes: (1) the allocation pursuant to the "other 
insurance" condition, between insurers who are all on the risk, or (2) 
the proration against the insured in situations where that insured 
had no opportunity to purchase potentially allocable insurance in 
the later years of a continuing injury.243 Proration against the in-
sured, based on "time on the risk" measured from the date of 
"escape" to the date of the claim, produces a remarkable anomaly 
when applied across the transition from "occurrence" to "claims-
made" coverage. That anomaly consists in the ratable reduction of 
the insured's recovery by each year of delay in the assertion of the 
claim by the plaintiff following the switch in policy forms. Any such 
result would be unique in the realm of insurance law-the creation 
of "disappearing coverage." 
A. How Should the Solution of These Problems Caused by the Switch in 
Policy Forms Be Affected by Traditional Basic Concepts of Insurance Law? 
As one court summarized more than a decade ago: 
General principles of insurance policy interpretation are: 
240. See Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 
1212,1216-17,1224 (6th Cir. 1980) (adopting the exposure theory which argues 
that injury takes place at time of exposure. All insurance policies in effect during 
any period of exposure are, then, triggered. 
241. See Stonewall, 73 F.3d at 1191-92. 
242. See id. at 1203. 
243. See id. 
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(1) the objective in construing the policies' coverage ofli-
ability must be to give effect to the policies' dominant 
purpose of indemnity; (2) ambiguity in an insurance con-
tract must be construed in favor of the insured; (3) the 
Court should ordinarily strive to give effect to the objec-
tively reasonable expectations of the insured.244 
B. The Continuing Vitality of Contra Proferentem 
Although insurance policies are like other contracts,245 in that 
clear language is enforced if it does not run counter to the insured's 
reasonable expectations and is not unconscionable,246 the mass stan-
dardization of the CGL policy, its language, and its application to a 
host of varying situations frequently creates ambiguity in the process 
of application. As a result, the principle of construing ambiguous 
contract language against the drafter is frequently relied on in insur-
. tho £ 247 ance cases construmg IS orm. 
This principle, while clearly documented in a leading decision 
of the Minnesota Supreme Court,248 has come under attack by some 
scholars as too simplistic and anti-insurer.249 However, Professor 
Abraham, a leading scholar in the field, recently examined insurance 
interpretation theory and found the approach of construction 
against the drafter well suited to the difficult task of adjudicating in-
250 surance coverage. 
The first principle of insurance law is captured by the 
244. See Hancock Lab., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520, 523, n.5 (9th 
Cir. 1985) (applying California law) (citing GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ENCY-
CLOPEDIAOF INSURANCE LAw §§ 15:41, 15:14, 15:16, 15:74 (Anderson 2d ed. 1959». 
245. See COUCH, supra note 244, §15:4. 
246. See id. 
247. See STEMPEL, supra note 139, at §§ 3, 5. (citing Nationsbank of North 
Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. 513 U.S. 251 (1995». 
248. See, e.g., SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 316 
(Minn. 1995) (stating that "[a]ny ambiguity regarding coverage is resolved in fa-
vor of the insured") (citation omitted). 
249. See David S. Miller, Note, Insurance as Contract: The Argument for Aban-
doning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1849, 1857 (1988) ("The protec-
tion offered by the ambiguity doctrine against overreaching by insurance compa-
nies is inappropriate when an insurance policy is the product of arms-length 
bargaining."); Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why 
Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REv. 171, 
174, 187-207 (1995) (discussing the costs imposed on insurers when ambiguities 
are construed against the insurer). 
250. See Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 
MICH. L. REv. 531, 533 (1996). 
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maxim contra proferentem. ... [I]n addition to contra profe-
rentem, policyholders may invoke such allied doctrines as 
waiver, estoppel, and the rule that reasonable expecta-
tions of the insured should be honored even if those ex-
pectations are unambiguously contradicted by fine-print 
provisions in the policy . 
. . . On balance, 1 prefer the traditional conception of con-
tra proferentem and a weaker version of the expectations 
principle. This combination leaves the courts to do more 
of what they are comparatively capable of doing-
interpret-and less of what they tend to do poorly-
regulate. Courts treat insurance policies differently than 
other contracts "because of their unique characteristics 
such as standardization, marketing on contract of adhe-
sion basis, complexity, policyholder reliance and vulner-
ability. ,,251 
559 
The time-honored process of interpreting questionable insur-
ance coverage in favor of the insured and against the insurer reflects 
a number of factors inherent in the underwriting and purchase of 
insurance.252 The essential purpose of insurance is to provide a 
measure of security and protection for the insured.258 Timely reim-
bursement of the insured for expense and loss, encouragement of 
settlement, maximum certainty of result and minimum risk, and cost 
of litigation to determine outcomes, are all a part of this approach.254 
An insurance policy is supposed to provide coverage, rather than be 
an invitation to a lawsuit.255 The threat of the process turning into 
just this invitation to a lawsuit is substantially compounded where, as 
in both the "occurrence" and "claims-made" policies, the policy can 
251. See id. at 531-32,568-69; see generally James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance 
Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text Ver.sus Context, 24 ARIz. ST. LJ. 
995, 999-1000 (1992) (examining common justifications for treating insurance 
contracts differently); Roger Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in 
Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 823, 827 (1990) (applying tradi-
tional principles of contra proferentem to the reasonable expectations doctrine); Pe-
ter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance Law: Dusting Off the Formal for the 
Function, 52 OHIO ST. LJ. 1037, 1050-54 (1991) (discussing the theory that insur-
ance contracts are not ordinary contracts); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reading Between the 
Lines: Insurance Contract Interpretation, TRIAL, Sept. 1995, at 74. 
252. See Fischer, supra note 251, at 999. 
253. See David Tartaglio, The Expectation of Peace of Mind: A Basis for Recovery 
of Damages for Mental Suffering Resulting from the Breach of First Party Insurance Con-
tracts, 565 CAL. L. REv. 1345, 1346, 1362 (1983). 
254. See id. at 1345-51 
255. See id. at 1346-47. 
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be, and frequently is, written as indemnity rather than liability cover-
age. Under this form, the insurer can simply sit back, force the in-
sured to incur years of investigation, defense, and settlement of the 
underlying risk, leave the insured "twisting slowly in the wind," and 
then contest every facet of the insured's conduct of the defense and 
compliance with every nit, actual or supposed, in the policy.256 Faced 
with very large claims for indemnification, some insurers consistently 
raise and contest every conceivable point, apparently without regard 
to positions they took in other cases or positions taken by other 
members of the ISO.257 Recent mass tort insurance litigation suggests 
the difficulties caused by such behavior patterns with respect to large 
corporate insureds.258 These behavior patterns are apt to have an 
even more serious impact on the smaller insured who lacks either 
the funding or the staying power to litigate for years with an insur-
ance carrier or carriers. Respect for the interests and expectations of 
the smaller insured, and recognition of the impact of insurer delays 
on the cash flow of insureds, underlies a great deal of the judicial at-
titude toward interpretation of insurance policies. There is, unfor-
tunately, an important and basic difference between automobile li-
ability coverage, where the insurer must provide both investigation 
and defense, and cover reasonable settlements at the risk of being 
found to have acted in bad faith under well-developed law, and eGL 
coverage where a common insurer practice is to do nothing, make 
the insured investigate, settle or pay the judgment, and then come 
after the insurer. Such insurer behavior patterns can operate, in a 
substantial way, to deprive the insured of much of the benefit 
thought to be derived from the purchase of insurance. Insurer pay-
ment delayed, and insurer obligation to pay sometimes unreasonably 
contested, both lead to a serious loss of, or reduction in, the benefit 
contracted for. 
C. Peace oj Mind and Invited Reliance 
Insurers sell and policyholders buy peace of mind and protec-
tion of assets. Speakers on behalf of insurers and insurer advertise-
256. See Veteran's Mem'\. Med. Ctr. v. Connecticut Ins. Guar. Ass'n, No. CV 
940246875,1996 WL 6734264, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 23,1996). 
257. See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 
1192. (2d Cir. 1995). Stonewall discusses the inability of insurers to agree to defini-
tions of policy terms such as bodily injury. See id. 
258. See In re Dow Coming Corp. 198 B.R. 214, 251 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
1996). 
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ments reinforce these concepts.259 "Electrifying Performance," 
"Spectacular Results," trumpets one. "Let us take the risks," says an-
other; "In fact, we don't believe there's any such thing as a 'standard' 
risk. Instead, we believe every risk can be better served by a creative 
underwriting approach"; "Serve your customers imaginatively and 
thrive. Serve your customers or else"; "You get action with [named 
insurer]"; "You know insurance can cost a lot more than just premi-
ums. That's why you need [named insurer]. We do everything we 
can to reduce your insurance costs in the first place, so you don't 
end up paying for it later." 
D. Determining the Number of Occurrences-A Preference for Maximizing 
Coverage 
The bewildering number of court decisions interpreting eGL 
policies might give the appearance of facial inconsistency. In some 
cases, for instance, multiple claims have been treated as one occur-
rence,260 whereas in other cases, they have been treated as separate 
occurrences.261 In almost all cases, however, consistency appears to 
lie, as it should, in the court's determination to maximize the use of 
available triggered insurance. The number of occurrences can be a 
matter of critical importance because it can affect whether more 
than one limit of liability applies, and because it also can determine 
the effect of a provision specifying a deductible when an insured is 
entided to indemnification.262 Most courts have used "cause" analysis 
to determine the number of occurrences according to the number 
of causes of covered 10ss.263 A few courts have used an "effects" analy-
259. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 59, app. A, at 447 (referring to a in-
surer's 1966 statement about the unprecedented coverage of the "occurrence" 
policy) 
260. See Michigan Chern. Corp. v. America Home Assurance Co., 728 F.2d 
374,378 (6th Cir. 1984). In that case, Michigan Chemical allegedly shipped con-
taminated livestock feed which was eventually distributed to unsuspecting dairy 
farmers throughout Michigan. See id. at 376. As a result, hundreds of claims were 
filed against Michigan Chemical which then submitted the claims to its insurer. 
See id. The court held that the accidental shipment was the sole occurrence un-
der the policy, regardless of the number of claims. See id. at 379. 
261. See Maurice Pincoffs Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 447 F.2d 
201,206-07 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that the occurrence under the policy was each 
sale by the insured of contaminated bird feed). 
262. See Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386, 1390 
(8th Cir. 1996). 
263. See Michigan Chem., 728 F.2d at 379 (applying Illinois law); Maurice Pin-
coffs, 447 F.2d at 206-07 (applying Texas law); Transport Ins. Co. v. Lee Way Mo-
tor Freight, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1325, 1330 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (applying Oklahoma 
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sis, which determines the number of occurrences by the number of 
victims or claimants impacted by the event at issue.264 The triggered 
insurance, however, is generally maximized in accordance with can-
ons of insurance policy construction.265 
In the provision of insurance coverage for products liability 
there is usually a particularly strong underlying reason for choosing a 
"cause" analysis.26 The complaint, after all, usually alleges a defect in 
design or manufacture, and/or an alleged failure to warn.267 The al-
leged defect is often generic to the product line as a whole rather 
than specific to one particular example.268 Nevertheless, cases such 
as Michigan Chemical and Maurice Pincoffl69 illustrate the malleability 
of cause analysis. In both cases, the courts could have viewed the 
manufacture of contaminated animal food as one occurrence for 
which there was coverage.270 Instead, both cases found multiple 
causes, and hence more available insurance, by deeming each whole-
sale shipment of cattle or bird feed to be the cause of damage. If, 
however, the courts had taken this analysis much further and, for ex-
ample, found every retail sale to be an occurrence, or every animal's 
ingestion to be a cause (thereby metamorphasizing cause analysis 
into effects analysis), the policyholder would have been hard pressed 
to e~oy as much coverage. Although either of the two hypothetical 
approaches would have made more coverage available at the top, 
each finding of an occurrence would also have required the policy-
law); STEMPEL, supra note 149, § 35.3. 
264. See Elston-Richards Storage Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am., 194 F. 
Supp. 673, 682 (W.D. Mich. 1960) (applying Illinois law) (noting that each injury 
constitutes a single occurrence, even if the result ofa common cause). 
265. See id. at 679 (setting forth well-recognized rules of insurance policy 
construction) . 
266. Three public policies underlie products liability law: "( 1) to place the 
burden of loss on those who can spread the costs of injuries to all purchasers; (2) 
to promote accident prevention; and (3) to relieve injured consumers of the of-
ten impossible burden of proving a manufacturer's negligence." W. PAGE KEETON 
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 98, at 692-93 (5th ed. 1984); see also Union 
Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 784 (Tex. 1995) ("Based on these poli-
cies, one logical limit for liability in product liability cases would be to restrict re-
covery to those damages caused by the use of the defective product and to those 
damages against which manufacturers can feasibly insure.") (emphasis in original 
omitted). 
267. See Elston-Richards, 194 F. Supp. at 678. 
268. See id. at 677-78. 
269. See supra notes 260-61. 
270. See id. While the court in Michigan Chemical, found the shipment of 
contaminated feed to be the "occurrence" and not the subsequent multiple re-
sales, it noted that had there been more than one shipment, each such shipment 
would have been a separate "occurrence." See 728 F.2d 374, 383 (6th Cir. 1984). 
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holder to spend its own funds to satisfy the deductible or self-insured 
retention necessary to obtain coverage. 
Similarly, in environmental pollution cases involving hanns re-
sulting from the disposal of toxic materials, courts have often con-
cluded that for the purpose of assessing the applicability of liability 
insurance, there is a single occurrence for purposes of triggering 
h . d 271 eac coverage peno . 
E. Time and Cost to the Insured and Society of Delayed Coverage 
When a loss occurs, a policyholder is generally in need of timely 
protection.272 Once again, insurance advertisements recognize and 
emphasize this need. Allowing litigation to focus on insurer prora-
tion, as contrasted with allocation between insurers, often leaves the 
insured sitting for years while the insurers argue about respective 
shares.27s Extended dispute and delay over issues of allocation rap-
idly impairs the reasonable expectations of the insured in purchasing 
insurance in the first place. It may also complicate, or even frustrate, 
any opportunity on the part of the insured to settle a large claim. 274 
The insured, without the participation of the insurer, may simply not 
have the funds needed to achieve a reasonable settlement. 275 An in-
surer with deep pockets, able to throw almost endless dollars at a 
lawsuit, can exert unfair economic pressure on many insureds who 
lack such means.276 Insurers are also often said to lose money on the 
underwriting side of the business while more than making up for this 
loss on the investment side. The significance of this, with respect to 
insurer tactics of delay and postponement, is clear. The longer the 
delay in payment exists, the greater th~ opportunity to realize in-
vestment side returns. Given the difference in spread between the 
applicable rates of prejudgment interest compared with investment 
271. For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided in Northern States 
Power Co. that there had been one occurrence for purposes of each applicable 
policy because the covered claim-soil pollution and remediation-stemmed 
from one underlying cause. 523 N.W.2d 657, 664-65 (Minn. 1994). 
272. See Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 152 (Kan. 1980) 
("An insured is usually suffering from physical injury or economic loss when bar-
gaining with the insurance company .... "). 
273. See Northern States Power, 523 N.W.2d at 662-63. 
274. See Spencer, 611 P.2d at 152 (noting that one of the reasons for an inde-
pendent bad faith tort against insurers is to cure the inequitable bargaining posi-
tion between insurer and insured). 
275. See id. 
276. See id. 
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returns, the economic incentive for insurers to delay rather than pay 
is very great. Courts need to be aware of this significant imbalance of 
power in deciding insurance cases. 
Delay in settlement or payment can have another steady, if 
somewhat concealed, result. Current inflation rates, are relatively 
benign. But 3 to 4% a year, compounded annually, quickly makes a 
significant difference in the ultimate payment to the insured where 
that payment is delayed by five years or more of wrangling in the 
courts-and the typical ultimate payment is not adjusted for infla-
tionary effect. 
Promoting and encouraging settlement of litigation is a crucial 
part of our civil justice process.277 Judge Weinstein, for example, 
spoke effectively of the importance of public policy in favor of set-
tlement in the "Agent Orange" case.278 The prospect of insurers ar-
guing among themselves over their respective obligations to the 
policyholder tends to stifle the settlement of underlying claims.279 A 
policyholder may often have no source for settlement payment other 
than its insurance proceeds. If those proceeds are held up because 
insurers are arguing over allocation, a policyholder may have no 
choice but to proceed to trial even in cases that should be settled. 
F. Creating Incentives for Appropriate Behavior lJy Insurers 
Because of the untenable position in which a policyholder is 
placed when an insurer fails to fulfill its commitments,280 courts have 
responded with a number of rules to deter insurer misconduct and 
rectifY the consequences in a relatively streamlined, effective man-
ner.281 If an insurer fails to perform its defense obligations, either be-
fore the fact or after the fact (by failing to make prompt payment of 
such expenses), or otherwise takes unfair advantage of its insured 
which is faced with a claim situation, additional damages should be 
277. See Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 65 F.3d 562, 572 
(7th Cir. 1995) (stating that the encouragement of voluntary settlement of civil 
claims is an important federal policy). 
278. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 747 
(E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
279. See Northern States Power, 523 N.W.2d at 663 (noting the unlikelihood of 
settlement when insurers are embroiled in allocation disputes). 
280. See Spencer, 611 P.2d at 158 ("The legislature has recognized the public 
interest nature of the insurance industry and has also recognized policy holders 
require protection because oftheir inequitable bargaining position."). 
281. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 37, § 7.8, at 877. 
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considered.
282 
One obvious remedy is to find bad faith against the 
insurer.
28g 
A majority of jurisdictions treat insurer bad faith as a tort 
subjecting the insurer to possible punitive damages.284 A significant 
minority of states, however, treat insurer bad faith as akin to a super-
breach of contract and provide only contract-based remedies for the 
policyholder.285 Although incidental and consequential damages for 
insurer bad faith can be substantial, they still pose significantly less 
deterrence for insurer bad faith than the tort action.286 
Even in a state with a strong array of tort remedies available for 
insurer bad faith,287 insurers may not be adequately deterred from 
breaching their obligations. So long as the insurer can articulate a 
seemingly reasonable basis for its actions disputing coverage, it has a 
chance of avoiding bad faith liability, particularly punitive damages, 
which must ordinarily be demonstrated by clear and convincing evi-
dence.288 As a result, bad faith exposure alone will ordinarily not be 
sufficient to protect policyholders if an insurer wrongfully fails to de-
fend, defends in a conflict-of-interest situation, mishandles the de-
fense, fails to pay costs of investigation, defense and settlement 
promptly, or otherwise takes unfair advantage of its insured. 
Consequently, a number of jurisdictions provide that if the in-
282. See id. at 878. See also Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 
724 (Minn. 1997) where the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed an award of de-
fense costs as damages together with an award of legal costs incurred in pursuing 
recovery from the insurer. 
283. See STEMPEL, supra note 139, § 19; see KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 37, 
§7.8(b), at 88l. 
284. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 37, § 7.8(h), at 898 ("Courts in many 
states have now concluded that when an insurer acts in reckless disregard of its 
insured's rights, an award of punitive damages may be justified."). 
285. See STEMPEL, supra note 139, §§ 19.2, 19.3; see also Seifert v. Farmers Un-
ion Mut. Ins. Co., 497 N.W.2d 694, 697 (N.D. 1993) (declining to extend the tort 
concept of negligence to acts or omissions of insurers). 
286. "[C]haracterizing the cause of action as a tort claim [as opposed to a 
contract claim] may broaden the measure of damages available to a claimant." 
KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 37, § 7.8, at 878. 
287. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 179 (Cal. 1967) 
(recognizing tort remedies for mental suffering against an insurer who wrongfully 
refused to settle a third party claim); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 89 
Cal. Rptr. 78, 93 (Ct. App. 1970); Farmers Group, Inc. v. Williams, 805 P.2d 419, 
426 (Col. 1991) (affirming a common-law tort remedy for bad faith breach of an 
insurance contract); Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 501 P.2d 368, 372 (Haw. 1972) 
(recognizing a cause of action for tortious breach of contract); Story v. City of 
Bozman, 791 P.2d 767, 773 (Mont. 1990) (recognizing that "an insurer's statutory 
duties create a duty of good faith and fair dealing sounding in tort and running to 
both the insured and third party claimants"). 
288. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 37, § 7.10, at 921-22. 
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surer controlling the defense rejects a reasonable settlement offer, it 
is liable for any resulting judgment against the policyholder, even if 
the judgment exceeds the policy limits. 289 Where an insurer fails to 
defend or pay defense costs, or abandons the defense in midstream, 
insurers are often found liable for not only policy limits but also con-
sequential damages such as counsel fees in prosecuting the coverage 
.. tho 290 act.lon agamst e msurer. 
IV. How THE TRADITIONAL CANONS OF INTERPRETATION, 
INCLUDING THE CONCEPT OF REAsONABLE EXPECTATIONS, CAN 
APPLY IN RESOLVING ISSUES OF "TAIL" LIABILl1Y UNDER THE 
"OCCURRENCE" POLICIES WRITTEN PRIOR TO 1986 
As discussed above,291 "occurrence" policies have been regularly 
construed to include later damage that resulted from an i~ury that 
occurred during the policy term.292 The issue often litigated has 
been the allocation of liability under these "occurrence" policies to-
gether with the insurer-argued-for proration of part of the loss 
. tho d 29s agaInst e msure . 
Also as discussed above, the ISO and its member insurers must 
be held responsible for the ambiguities inherent in the definition of 
"occurrence," the conscious choice not to incorporate a meaningful 
allocation provision in the policy, and their representations, in or 
about 1986, that the new "claims-made" policy would not affect the 
operation of the previous "occurrence" policy. Application of either 
or both of the ambiguity and reasonable expectations doctrines rein-
forces the conclusion that once the coverage of an "occurrence" pol-
icy has been triggered with respect to an injury, the proceeds of that 
policy should be available to the insured without proration.294 The 
289. See e.g., Johansen V. California State Auto Ass'n, Inter-Ins. Bureau, 538 
P.2d 744, 746 (Cal. 1975); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 
1967); see also Northfield Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 545 N.W.2d 
57, 60 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Short v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 334 N.W.2d 384, 
387 (Minn. 1983) (stating that an insurer may become liable in excess of its cov-
erage under a policy if it fails to exercise good faith in considering settlement of-
fers for an amount within the policy limit». 
290. See, e.g., Beckwith Mach. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 638 F. Supp. 
1179,1186 (W.D. Pa. 1986); Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724 
(Minn. 1997). 
291. See supra Part I1.G. 
292. See HiJlman & DeYoung, supra note 105, at 293. 
293. See, e.g., Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974 (NJ. 
1994). 
294. See Howard, supra note 162, at 626 n.6. 
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reasonable expectations doctrine has been adopted, clearly, as part 




In 1970, then Professor Robert E. Keeton, now a federal district 
court judge in Boston, made one of his many substantial contribu-
tions to the growth of insurance law doctrine.297 The gist of his rec-
ommendation was that courts should go further than merely resolv-
ing ambiguities favorably to the insured.298 According to Keeton, if 
an insurance buyer could reasonably understand and expect that 
certain benefits under the policy were thus and so, then a court 
should give effect to that understanding and rule for the insured de-
spite language to the contrary found elsewhere in the policy.299 Min-
nesota is one of many states that have adopted Judge Keeton's view.30o 
In Atwater, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that although a 
definition of "burglary" was included in the insurance policy, and al-
though this definition was not ambiguous, it should be interpreted 
according to the reasonable expectations of the insured.30) The pol-
icy in Atwater contained an "evidence of forcible entry" clause as a 
requirement of coverage.302 A theft occurred at night and Atwater 
filed a claim.303 The insurer denied the claim on the grounds that 
"there were no visible marks of physical damage to the exterior at 
that point of entrance or to the interior at the point of exit, as re-
quired by the definition of burglary in the policy. ,,304 The Supreme 
295. See Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 523 N.W.2d 
657,661 (Minn. 1994). 
296. See ABRAHAM, supra note 114, at 57; Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 823, 823 
n.5 (1990) (noting that 16 states have adopted the doctrine). 
297. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provi-
sions, 83 HARv. L. REv. 961 (1970). 
298. See id. at 967 (stating that "[t]he principle of honoring reasonable ex-
pectations should be extended further, protecting the policyholders' expectations 
as long as they are objectively reasonable from the layman's point of view, in spite 
of the fact that had he made a painstaking study of the contract, he would have 
understood the limitation that defeats the expectations at issue.") 
299. See id. 
300. See Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 
271,277 (Minn. 1985) 
301. See id. at 278-79 (holding "where the technical definition of burglary in 
a burglary insurance policy is, in effect, an exclusion from coverage, it will not be 
interpreted so as to defeat the reasonable expectations of the purchaser of the 
policy.") 
302. See id. at 274. 
303. See id. 
304. Id. 
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Court declined to decide the case on the basis of an ambiguity in the 
policy.30S The court in a landmark pronouncement of the doctrine 
stated: 
Some courts and commentators have recognized that 
the burglary definition at issue in this case constitutes a 
rather hidden exclusion from coverage. Exclusions in in-
surance contracts are read narrowly against the insurer. 
Running through the many court opinions refusing to lit-
erally enforce this burglary definition is the concept that 
the definition is surprisingly restrictive, that no one pur-
chasing something called burglary insurance would ex-
pect coverage to exclude skilled burglaries that leave no 
visible marks of forcible entry or exit. Professor Robert E. 
Keeton, in analyzing these and other insurance cases 
where the results often do not follow from the rules 
stated, found there to be two general principles underly-
ing many decisions. These principles are the reasonable 
expectations of the insured and the unconscionability of 
the clause itself or as applied to the facts of a specific case. 
Keeton's article and subsequent book, Basic Text on Insur-
ance Law, (1971), have had significant impact on the con-
struction of insurance contracts. 
The doctrine of protecting the reasonable expectations 
of the insured is closely related to the doctrine of con-
tracts of adhesion. Where there is unequal bargaining 
power between the parties so that one party controls all of 
the terms and offers the contract on a take-it-or-Ieave-it 
basis, the contract will be strictly construed against the 
party who drafted it. Most courts recognize the great dis-
parity in bargaining power between insurance companies 
and those who seek insurance. Further, they recognize 
that, in the majority of cases, a lay person lacks the neces-
sary skills to read and understand insurance policies, 
which are typically long, set out in very small type and 
written from a legalistic or insurance expert's perspective. 
Finally, courts recognize that people purchase insurance 
relying on others, the agent or company, to provide a pol-
icy that meets their needs. The result of the lack of insur-
ance expertise on the part of insureds and the recognized 
marketing techniques of insurance companies is that 
"[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of applicants 
and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insur-
305. See id. at 276. 
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ance contracts will be honored even though painstaking 
study of the Rolicy provisions would have negated those 
• "g06 expectatIons. 
The court continued: 
The reasonable-expectations doctrine gives the court a 
standard by which to construe insurance contracts without 
having to rely on arbitrary rules which do not reflect real-
life situations and without having to bend and stretch 
those rules to do justice in individual cases. As Professor 
Keeton points out, ambiguity in the language of the con-
tract is not irrelevant under this standard but becomes a 
factor in determining the reasonable expectations of the 
insured, along with such factors as whether the insured 
was told of important, but obscure, conditions or exclu-
sions and whether the particular provision in the contract 
at issue is an item known by the public generally. The 
doctrine does not automatically remove from the insured 
a responsibility to read the policy. It does, however, rec-
ognize that in certain instances, such as where major ex-
clusions are hidden in the definitions section, the insured 
should be held only to reasonable knowledge of the literal 
terms and conditions. The insured may show what actual 
expectations he or she had, but the factfinder should de-
termine whether those expectations were reasonable un-
der the circumstances.307 
569 
In Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Travelers Indemnity 
Co., the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed a problem arising out 
of environmental pollution under the CGL "occurrence based" pol-
icy form.308 The question at issue was whether "response costs," that 
is to say costs of remedying a contaminated site, required by the 
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, were damages within the 
meaning of the CGL pOlicy.309 The insurers argued that the CGL 
policies indemnifY the insureds only when the insureds are legally 
obligated to pay damages to a third party.310 The court held that the 
word "damages," as used in the policy, was ambiguous as it was sus-
306. Id. at 27fr77 (quoting Keeton, supra note 297, at 967). 
307. Id. 
308. 457 N.W.2d 175, 177 (Minn. 1990). 
309. See id. at 177-78 (bringing motions for summary judgment, the insur-
ance companies sought "declarations that claims for environmental cleanup costs 
mandated by the MPCA are not covered 'damages' within the meaning of the 
CGL policies.") 
310. See id. at 178. 
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ceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.31l The court 
then continued with a holding as to the insured's reasonable expec-
tations: 
It is consistent with the reasonable expectations of the in-
sureds under these policies that the clean up costs be cov-
ered. Another court, reaching the same conclusion, 
noted that "[iJ t would come as an unexpected, if not in-
comprehensible, shock to the insureds to discover that 
their insurance coverage was being denied because plain-
tiff chose to frame his complaint in equity rather than in 
law." If a narrow, technical definition of the term 
"damages" was intended by the insurance companies, it 
was their duty to make that intention clear. The insureds 
purchased these "comprehensive general liability" policies 
expecting coverage against most legal liabilities which 
could arise out of their own acts or omissions, including 
liabilities which were unknown at the time. The standard 
language used in the policy is broad. The insurers agreed 
that they "will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which 
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as dam-
ages because of bodily injury or property damage to which 
this insurance applies caused by an occurrence." The util-
ity of the policy would be seriously called into question if 
coverage is permitted to hinge on such a fortuitous event 
as whether a plaintiff bringing an action against the in-
sured has framed his complaint in equity rather than in 
law. Clearly the insureds under these policies contem-
plated greater certainty when they purchased the policies. 
They could reasonably expect the policy to provide cover-
age for any economic outlay compelled by law to rectifY or 
mitigate damage caused by the insured's acts or omis-
• 312 SlOns. 
In Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota v. Royal Insurance 
Co. of America, the Minnesota Supreme Court had occasion to revisit 
the subject of the doctrine of reasonable expectations.313 From 1969 
until 1972, the University had installed asbestos-containing fireproof-
ing material in some of its buildings.314 The University later incurred 
311. See id. at 179 (relying on the "rules of insurance contract interpretation 
which require that undefined terms be given their 'plain, ordinary, and popular 
meaning"') . 
312. [d. at 181-82 (citation omitted). 
313. 517 N.W.2d 888,891 (Minn. 1994). 
314. See id. at 889. 
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significant cost in removing the asbestos. Having settled with the 
manufacturer, the University sued its insurer.~15 The court of appeals 
held that coverage was excluded by a "pollution exclusion" in both 
primary and excess policies.~16 The primary and excess policies at is-
sue were in the CGL "occurrence based" fonnat.Si7 The Supreme 
Court, in this case, gave the Atwater decision a narrower interpreta-
. 318 oon. 
In interpreting the language of the exclusion clause in the pri-
mary policies, however, the court held that the words "discharge, 
dispersal, release or escape of ... pollutants into or upon land, the 
atmosphere, or any water course or body of water" did not apply to 
an escape of pollutants within a building.319 The air of a building was 
held to be something other than the "atmosphere.,,32o In contrast, 
the exclusion in the excess policies referred to "pollution of land, 
. al al ,,321 Th· di th water, air or re or person property.... IS wor ng, e court 
held, was effective to exclude liability for pollutants escaping inside a 
b ·ld· 322 Ul mg. 
In Northern States Powerv. Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court once again, and without the more re-
strictive reading of the Board of Regents decision, indicated that the 
reasonable expectations doctrine is part of Minnesota insurance 
I 323 aw. 
In Eiynk v. Sabrowsky, the insurer issued a liability policy to the 
insured.324 Three years later the insurer renewed the policy but 
added a new exclusion for bodily injury to family members. 325 The 
insurer did not notifY the insured of the newly added tenn.326 The 
policy was subsequently renewed multiple times without reference to 
315. See id. at 889-90. 
316. See id. at 890. 
317. See id. 
318. See id. at 891 (holding that where an exclusion of coverage is plainly 
designated in a CGL policy, and a claim of ambiguity is raised, the Atwater reason-
able expectation test does not apply, as "[t]he reasonable expectation test is not a 
license to ignore the pollution exclusion in this case nor to rewrite the exclusion 
solely to conform to a result that the insured might prefer."). 
319. See Board of Regents, 517 N.W.2d at 893. 
320. See id. 
321. See id. at 893 n.7. 
322. See id. at 893-94. 
323. 523 N.W.2d 657, 661 (Minn. 1994). 
324. 524 N.W.2d 297,298 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994). 
325. See id. 
326. See id. 
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the added exclusion. m The court of appeals concluded that when 
an insurer substantially reduces coverage through a renewal or en-
dorsement, it must notifY the insured of the change in writing. 328 
Commenting on the basis of this decision the court stated: 
The holding in Canadian Universal was explained by refer-
ence to contracts of adhesion. Later supreme court analy-
sis suggests that Canadian Universal was based on the rea-
sonable expectations of the insured. Under the 
reasonable expectations doctrine, an insured would rea-
sonably expect each renewal or subsequent policy to be 
on the same terms as the original unless the insured had 
notice of any change in coverage.329 
From the above cases, it is clear that the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations is a material part of Minnesota insurance law, and in 
particular, hidden coverage exclusions will be ignored if inconsistent 
with the insured's reasonable expectations. 
When speaking of "reasonable expectations," one must use 
some care. Commentators have referred to a range of uses of the 
doctrine.33o For simplicity's sake, one might speak of a "strong" or 
"pure" version of the doctrine, as identified by Judge Keeton, that 
the reasonable expectations of the policyholder will be honored 
even where the policy language clearly precludes coverage.33! It is 
important to remember that Judge Keeton limited this principle to 
cases where the policyholder's expectations were objectively reason-
able.332 One might also posit a "weak" version of the doctrine that 
protects the reasonable expectations of the insured only when the 
327. See id. 
328. See id. at 298 (citing Canadian Universal Ins. Co., v. Fire Watch, Inc., 
258 N.W.2d 570,575 (Minn. 1977) (holding that insurers must notify the insured 
when an insurer by renewal, notification, or endorsement substantially changes 
the insured's prior coverage». 
329. Eiynk, 524 N.W.2d at 299 (citing Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l 
Mut. Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 278 (Minn. 1985». 
330. See, e.g., JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 
1l.4.5 (1994) (finding as many as six different variations in state court approaches 
to reasonable expectations, ranging from total rejection of the doctrine to adop-
tion of a "pure" form of doctrine to override even explicit policy language); Mark 
C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REv. 323, 354 (1986) 
(noting that reasonable expectations analysis is reserved by most states for am-
biguous policy language and not applied where language is clear even if surpris-
ing and adverse to the policyholder). 
331. See Rahdert, supra note 330, at 354. 
332. See id. at 334-36. 
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policy language is ambiguous.m Minnesota could be described as 
employing a "moderate" version of reasonable expectations analysis 
that will override clear policy language, where the court views the 
language as operating in the nature of a hidden exclusion.334 But in 
a case like Atwater, which refused to apply the "visible marks" defini-
tion in a burglary policy, the court was arguably straining to label the 
visible marks definition as hidden merely because it was contained as 
a definition rather than as an exclusion.335 Without doubt, however, 
Minnesota courts have been receptive to protecting the reasonable 
expectations of the policyholder where the policy language at issue is 
b . 336 am 19uOUS. 
The insurers' argument, rejected in Stonewall, Owens-Illinois, 
d u 337 th th· d ·th " ". an nateo at e Insure must prorate WI occurrence earn-
ers for years when it could not purchase occurrence coverage for 
the risk (either because of exclusion or change in form to claims-
made policies) does not fit with the insured's reasonable expecta-
tions. 33B Allocation by "time on the risk" should not be allowed to 
have the effect of reducing coverage under an occurrence policy 
once that coverage has attached. There is no known doctrine of 
insurance law or canon of construction stating that once coverage 
has attached in a particular coverage year, it can be reduced or 
eroded by events that happen in following years in the manner 
urged by the insurers in these cases. If the issue is proration be-
tween multiple insurers, each on the risk, that is one matter. But 
progressive reduction of the insured's coverage is another. 
The inequity of allocating, as the insurers argue, by "time on 
the risk" down to the date of claim across "occurrence" and 
"claims-made" policies339 can be illustrated as follows. Clearly the 
date of filing the claim is largely fortuitous. Assuming 
"occurrence" coverage for 1981-85, and "claims-made" coverage for 
years 1986-90, a claim referencing the "occurrence" policies might 
333. See Atwater, 366 N.W.2d at 275. 
334. See id. at 276. 
335. See id. 
336. See id. at 277-78. 
337. See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1178 
(2d Cir. 1995); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 995 (NJ. 
1994); Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., v. Allstate Ins. Co., 801 F. Supp. 1334, 
1373 (D.N]. 1992). 
338. See ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE LAw § 6.1, at 341 (1971) (detailing 
the fairness policies associated with the doctrine of reasonable expectation). 
339. See Frame, supra note 2, at 169-78 (discussing the history and develop-
ment of "occurrence" and "claims-made" policies). 
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be brought in 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990 or thereafter. Applying 
the insurers' argument, the insured's available coverage would 
erode progressively with each year of delay by the plaintiff in bring-
ing the claim. Thus, if the claim were brought in 1985, the insured 
would be fully covered under the "occurrence" policies. If the 
claim were brought in 1986, the insurer would, under this theory, 
be responsible for 5/6ths of the loss. If the claim were brought in 
1987, the insurer would be responsible for 5/7ths of the loss. If the 
claim were brought in 1988, the insurer would be responsible for 
5/8ths of the loss. If the claim were brought in 1989, the insurer 
would be responsible for 5/9ths of the loss. If the claim were 
brought in 1990, the insurer would be responsible for 5/10ths of 
the loss, and so on. Any such progressive reduction of triggered 
occurrence insurance coverage that would result from such a 
wholly arbitrary circumstance, extrinsic to the procurement of the 
occurrence insurance coverage, and the initial triggering of that 
coverage, cannot be supported 10gically.340 
The policies involved all deal with the issue of availability of 
other insurance and apportionment of loss with that other insur-
ance through the device of the "other insurance" clauses. This 
process assumes two or more available policies and proration be-
tween the two-the insured is preserved whole but the triggered 
insurers share. As suggested above, those clauses cannot result, on 
the face of their language, in the taking away of coverage from the 
insured once that coverage has attached. 341 These clauses are the 
express terms of the insurance coverage inserted in the policies to 
deal with the issues of allocation of liability among insurers, albeit 
ineffectively in the case of the CGL policies.342 If time on the risk 
allocation on the present facts were to involve proration across all 
years between attachment of coverage and the commencement of 
suit, such a process would be tantamount to implying an additional 
insurance provision, flatly inconsistent with the express provision, 
and resulting in the progressive removal of coverage from the in-
sured.343 Minnesota law is clear-insurance policies are contracts 
and are to be interpreted as such under the traditional canons of 
interpretation.344 One primary canon is that no term should be im-
340. See id. 
341. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
342. See Stonewall, 73 F.3d at 1218. 
343. See supra note 341 and accompanying text. 
344. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 
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plied in a contract where such an implied term would contradict 
dd f . . 845 an erogate rom an eXIstmg express term. 
Sound public policy supports the same conclusion. In many 
situations, insurance may be the only resource from which injured 
plaintiffs can ultimately be cared for. A proration system which 
progressively reduces coverage, as argued by insurers, however, can 
act as a counter to the indemnity characteristics of insurance, thus 
reducing the fund to which plaintiffs may have access. 846 
Any such progressive reduction in coverage, once it has at-
tached, must run contrary to the expectations of the insured.847 A 
manufacturer who makes and sells widgets over a five year period 
of 1978 through 1982, when purchasing products liability coverage 
in each of those years, expects protection against claims, based on 
faulty widgets, to be covered with respect to injuries that occur be-
tween 1978 and 1982. The manufacturer would never dream that 
coverage which attached during those years, would be reduced by 
circumstances occurring beyond 1982, or that its insurers could ar-
gue that they would not cover ongoing problems of claimants who 
were injured during these years. 
Any other approach would leave the manufacturer severely 
underinsured with respect to claims for injuries which manifested 
later. The manufacturer would have no forewarning that coverage 
for injuries that occurred and attached during the policy periods 
would be reduced because the resulting injury continued after the 
policy period. Nothing in the policy language warns of any such 
arbitrary and unanticipated result. 
Moreover, the insurer's approach would leave the manufac-
turer exposed to the annual insurer's choice to withdraw or change 
a particular coverage provision, a choice which, when exercised, 
would have the retroactive effect of reducing or depriving the 
manufacturer of previously purchased coverage. The author of a 
recent article notes the possibility, and the negative effect of such 
action under the "claims-made" form. 846 
The practical difference between occurrence and claims-
made policies shows up in delayed disaster situations such 
175,179 (Minn. 1990) (setting forth some basic rules of contract interpretation). 
345. See First Nat'l Bank v. Thorpe Bros., 179 Minn. 574, 577,229 N.W. 871, 
873 (1930) (holding that contract provisions are not to be implied where they 
would take the place of express provisions). 
346. See supra note 341 and accompanying text. 
347. See id. 
348. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE LJ. 1,1 (1996). 
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as asbestos, toxic waste, or cigarettes. Under an occur-
rence policy, the insurer pays for the disaster when the 
claims are finally made. Under a claims-made policy, as 
soon as the insurer sees that massive numbers of claims 
will be filed over the coming years, the insurer declines to 
. th '1' 349 wnte e next year s po ICy .... 
The last consideration under the "reasonable expectations" 
doctrine is the possible argument that this doctrine should provide 
no help for a sophisticated insured with long experience in purchas-
ing CGL coverage. While the Minnesota courts have indicated that 
the level of sophistication and understanding of the insured can be a 
relevant factor in considering the reasonable expectations doc-
trine,350 the insurer arguments with respect to allocation are so ab-
struse that no insured, regardless of the level and extent of its insur-
ance department, could reasonably be expected to foresee and 
understand it in advance.351 Professional experience in corporate 
management and insurance practice supports this conclusion. 
V. How MIGHT THE INSURER ARGUMENTS FOR PRORATION AGAINST 
THE INSURED WORK OUT IN THE CONTEXT OF INSURED RISKS OTHER 
THAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION AND AsBESTOSIS? 
A current mass tort, of monumental proportions in terms of 
numbers of claims asserted, involves the allegation of injury resulting 
from the surgical implantation of silicone gel breast implants.352 The 
claims in these cases include assertions that the surgical implantation 
was performed without informed consent, and that silicone gel 
breast implants can cause abnormal immune or auto-immune re-
sponse and may lead to "atypical" auto-immune disease.353 
349. Id. at 78. 
350. See Atwater Creamery Co. v. Western Nat'l Mutual Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 
271, 277 (Minn. 1985) (noting lack of insurance expertise can playa role in the 
reasonable expectations doctrine). 
351. The Minnesota Supreme Court found this doctrine applicable in the 
case of three sophisticated corporate insureds (three separate cases consolidated 
for hearing purposes) in Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. The Trav-
elers Indemnity Co., 457 N.W.2d 175, 181-82 (Minn. 1990). The court in that 
case rejected the argument that the level of sophistication of the insured should 
make the doctrine of reasonable expectations inapplicable. 
352. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation v. Dow 
Coming Corp., No. CV 92-P-10000-5, 1994 WL 114580, at *11 (N.D. Ala. Apr. I, 
1994) (noting the many similar lawsuits also pending at the time). 
353. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1402 (D. Or. 
1996). Hall involved atypical connective tissue disease (ACTD). The court noted 
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Apparently fueled by massive negative publicity in the early 
1990's,~54 these cases are now showing signs of taking a remarkable 
turn in the opposite direction.~55 Because of the volume of both 
individual and class action claims on behalf of such implant recipi-
ents, these claims were ordered consolidated and transferred to 
Judge Sam Pointer's court in the Northern District of Alabama for 
pretrial purposes.~56 Judge Pointer certified the plaintiffs as a class 
for purposes of settlement against defendants including all of the 
known manufacturers of silicone gel breast implants.S57 Thereafter, 
Judge Pointer approved first a so-called "Global Settlement Agree-
ment," and thereafter a "Revised Settlement Agreement" covering 
many of the leading manufacturers of such implants but providing 
for opt-out for plaintiffs so electing.~58 A group of such "opt-outs" 
was assigned by Judge Pointer back to Judge Robert E. Jones in 
Oregon for trial on the merits.~59 Pursuant to a timely request by 
defense counsel, Judge Jones held a Rule 702 "Daubert" hearing to 
determine whether the medical experts offered on behalf of the 
plaintiffs would be permitted to testifY at the forthcoming trial.~60 
Judge Jones appointed a panel of independent experts and, based 
on the opinions of that panel, ruled in limine that the plaintiffs 
would not be permitted to present their medical witnesses to the 
jury.~61 Judge Jones decided to suspend the effect of this ruling 
pending the outcome of a similar hearing now being conducted by 
that "[tlhis 'disease' allegedly manifests itself through a constellation of various 
symptoms and is allegedly caused by an autoimmune response to silicone from 
breast implants." Id. 
354. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation, 837 
F. Supp. 1128, 1130 (N.D. Ala. 1993) (noting that "[olver the last several years, 
thousands of lawsuits against numerous defendants have been filed across the 
country by persons claiming to have been injured from silicone breast implants"). 
355. See id. 
356. See id. 
357. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation, No. 
CV 92-P-10000-S, 1994 WL 114580, at *2,11 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 1, 1994) (certifying 
the plaintiffs as a non-mandatory "opt-out" plaintiff settlement class). 
358. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation, No. 
CV-92-P-10000-S, 1994 WL 578353, at *6, (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (noting that the 
total number of persons opting out of the class is a small fraction-less than 5%-
of the total number of putative class members and that most persons opting out 
did so because they "believed they could recover more through individual litiga-
tion than under the settlement"). 
359. See Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Or. 
1996). 
360. See id. at 1392-93. 
361. See id. at 1394. 
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Judge Pointer. s62 He also noted that two other such hearings had 
been held recently in New York by Judges Weinstein and Baer.s6s 
Judge Jones issued the following order: 
For the reasons stated above, those portions of defen-
dants' motions in limine that seek exclusion of any expert 
testimony concerning a general causal link between sili-
cone gel breast implants and ACTD or any systemic illness 
or syndrome are GRANTED .... 
Specifically, I will exclude as irrelevant any testimony or 
evidence of the following: ACTD; any systemic illness or 
syndrome or autoimmune disorder of any kind; any emo-
tional distress claims arising out of any alleged fear of de-
veloping any systemic disease or injury or fear of can-
,,364 cer. 
Reassertion of any causal relationship between breast implant 
and injury has thus been challenged. Judge Jones' ruling is based 
on the absence of appropriate evidence of any causal relationship 
between the surgical implantation of silicone gel breast implants 
and systemic or autoimmune disease. s65 However, massive litigation 
has already occurred in the class action proceedings before Judge 
Pointer and substantial settlements have been approved. s66 A few 
individual lawsuits have already been tried to conclusion, many 
with a verdict for the defense, but some with substantial verdicts for 
the plaintiff. s67 Furthermore, additional proceedings (involving 
core proceedings jurisdiction pursuant to U.S. Bankruptcy Code § 
157 (b )(2)(A» have gone forward in federal bankruptcy court in 
Michigan involving Dow Coming and other defendants joined as 
co-defendants with Dow Coming in particular cases.S68 
Doubtless, since the more significant volume of such breast 
implants were implanted during the time when "occurrence" 
products liability coverage was available, the insurers will once 
362. See id. at 1394 (noting]udge Pointer had appointed a national panel of 
experts and that further scientific developments could occur prior to the comple-
tion of the panel's work). 
363. See id. 
364. See id. at 1414. 
365. See id. at 1414-15 (holding absent proof of general causation). 
366. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation, No. 
CV-92-P-lOOOO-S, 1994 WL 578353, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (approving a 
settlement awarding plaintiffs in excess of$4 billion). 
367. See id. at *6. 
368. See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. 214 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
1996). 
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again litigate coverage for silicone gel breast implant claims under 
these policies. 
While under the Stonewall court approach the differences do 
not matter, significant factual differences exist between the circum-
stances of the alleged breast implant injury and those of the envi-
ronmental pollution and asbestos cases. As discussed earlier, the 
key to the allocation of environmental pollution insurance cover-
age has been the evidentiary presumption that, in the absence of 
discrete and identifiable events, the injury is to be presumed to oc-
cur in equal increments across each year between the "escape" and 
the claim.369 In the asbestos cases, the courts have adopted medical 
testimony establishing that the disease is a continuing and progres-
sive one, thus affected by successive exposures to inhalation of as-
bestos fibers over a period of years. 370 By way of contrast, in the 
breast implant cases, a key initial feature of some of the complaint 
assertions is the tort of battery-namely, that the surgical implanta-
tion was undertaken without adequate notice or warning of the 
dangers involved.371 Again, along with the complaints, the allega-
tions apparently allege that injury followed almost immediately af-
ter the surgical implantation and continued to be present for peri-
ods of years thereafter. On the facts, do these cases state an injury 
that is crisply related to the time of the surgery, and therefore trig-
ger the policy in effect as of that date? Or, assuming that the plain-
tiffs allege continuing injury through subsequent years, are 
"occurrence" policies for those later years also triggered? And, if 
so, what shall be said of allocation? 
As discussed above,372 the insurance policy in effect at the time 
of the surgical implantation is clearly "triggered" by that event and 
must respond not only for the injury alleged to have occurred in 
that year, but also for any injury alleged to have occurred in subse-
quent years.373 Likewise, assuming a basis for the allegations of con-
369. See supra notes 206, 223 and accompanying text. 
370. See Hancock Lab., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir. 
1985). 
371. See supra note 353 and accompanying text. 
372. See supra Part II.G.l-4 (discussing generally when policies triggered). 
373. See Hancock Lab., 777 F.2d at 524 (applying California law). In this case 
the insured, an aortic heart valve manufacturer, provided a porcine heart valve 
that had been contaminated and the contaminated valve was surgically implanted 
in the claimant who then suffered progressive resultant disease. See id. at 521-22. 
The court said, "The infectious disease process resulting from the contaminated 
Hancock heart valve is similar to a cumulative progressive type of disease rather 
than a common type of disease or ordinary accident." See id. at 524. The court 
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tinuing injuries in subsequent "occurrence" years, there can be lit-
tle question that those policies are also "triggered." The respective 
"occurrence" insurers may fight, if they wish, about allocation be-
tween the respective insurers, but under the doctrine of Stonewall, 
Owens-Illinois, and Hatco,374 there should be no issue in these cases 
of proration against the insured. Unlike the environmental cases, 
there is no new "external event" each policy year, either proven or, 
as a result of the evidentiary presumption, presumed.375 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The "occurrence" based CGL policy enjoyed a checkered his-
tory and generated enormous litigation. The problems were self-
inflicted by the general commercial liability industry and the ISO. 
The industry deserves the right to rethink and regroup, through 
the introduction and provision of the now only relatively new 
"claims-made" policy. The industry should not be permitted to 
change retroactively, through a novel and very recent policy inter-
pretation assertion, the coverage due to insureds who purchased 
"occurrence" coverage in good faith and who have been called 
upon to defend or pay claims relating to injury that occurred, ini-
tially, during the period of those policies. There never has been a 
concept of "progressively vanishing insurance coverage," and no 
such concept shout'd now be created through an extremely strained 
construction of an ambiguous insurance policy provision. 
held that the insurer on the risk at the time of surgical implantation of the valve 
was completely obligated. See id. at 525; see also Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 972 F.2d 805,813-14 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that the insurer on the risk at 
the time of installation of a plumbing system was held liable for the subsequent 
failure of that system causing physical damage to the structure). 
374. See supra note 337 and accompanying text. 
375. See Hancock Lab. Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir. 
1985). 
